

Reformist Coalitions and Regime Type: A Theory of Electoral System Change Applied to Ecuador *

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Abstract

Throughout its history, Ecuador’s electoral system has been subject to constant revision, especially during the democratic era. Although much has been written about these changes, extant theory fails to provide a coherent framework for reform. In this paper, I explain electoral change as a function of different types of reformist coalitions conditional on regime type. Consistent with the scholarly literature, elites under authoritarianism pursued electoral changes to maximize their power or minimize their potential electoral losses in the face of extra-systemic challenges via coalition-insulating reforms. However, under democracy, political fragmentation and weak party system institutionalization have made parties less able to maximize their long-term interests, meaning that reform took on a bottom-up, coalition-realigning nature. This framework helps explain, among other puzzles, the counter-intuitive adoption of panachage in 1997 and then closed lists in 2020. I evaluate this coalition theory by reconstructing the dominant actors and the interests behind seven key moments of electoral reform: 1830, 1861, 1929, 1947, 1979, 1997, and 2020.

Keywords: *Electoral system reform, Elites, Proportional representation, Closed lists, Open lists, Ecuador*

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1 Introduction

Ecuador's electoral rules have been subject to constant reform throughout its history. Like other Latin American states, the country moved from indirect to direct elections in the nineteenth century, embraced the limited vote in the first half of the twentieth century, and moved toward the representation of minorities through the adoption of proportional representation in the mid-twentieth century. Since re-democratization in 1979, however, Ecuador has deviated from other countries in the region in unusual ways, including adopting new rules for nearly every contest (Pachano 2008). Two fundamental changes in the democratic period stand out: 1) the adoption of *panachage*, or vote mixing, to allow voters multiple votes within or across party lists (manifested in the multiple non-transferable vote system in 1998 and as free list proportional representation from 2002 to 2017), and 2) the abandonment of this highly candidate-centered system in favor of returning to party-centered closed list proportional representation in 2020.

The evolution of these rules presents at least two puzzles. First, quite simply, what are the causes of electoral change in Ecuador? What explains the country's adherence to regional trends in the evolution of its electoral system throughout the first 150 years of its history and the subsequent deviation from these tendencies in the past 40? Are reforms attempts at power maximization (e.g., Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999; Benoit 2007), the result of some haphazard decision at a critical political juncture (Reynolds 2006; Allen 2017), or something else altogether? Second, why did electoral authorities adopt such an extreme open list system in 1997—and then take the extraordinary step of switching from open lists to closed lists in 2020? There was little precedent for either the former or the latter: *panachage* had rarely if ever been used outside of Europe, especially at the level of assembly elections, while electoral system reform under proportional representation generally moves from closed lists to open lists (Renwick and Pilet 2016).

Building off a line tradition of scholarship (e.g., Nagel 1998; Benoit 2004; Santucci 2022), I advance the argument that electoral change throughout Ecuador's history can be understood as a function of different types of reformist coalitions. Unlike these authors, however, I argue that the composition of the coalition, in turn, is influenced by the political regime in place. Under authoritarianism, Ecuador elites pursued electoral changes to maximize their power or minimize their electoral losses in the face of extra-systemic challenges via coalition-insulating reforms, a behavior consistent with the conventional wisdom. However, under democracy, political fragmentation and weak party system institutionalization made parties less able to maximize their long-term interests, meaning that reform was more likely to take a coalition-realigning or polarizing nature. This framework helps explain not only how the Ecuadorian

case closely followed other Latin American ones before 1979, but why it diverged afterward.

The implications of this work are manifold. Existing theories of electoral reform developed from the experience of the U.S., with its two-party system, or Western Europe, with its strong parties, are not well suited to weakly institutionalized multiparty systems. Perhaps the most enduring conventional wisdom about electoral system change—that parties alter rules to minimize electoral losses or preserve their representation—is based on the assumption of a stable party system with one or more strong parties. But far fewer theories exist to explain electoral system change in the absence of an institutionalized party system, as in Ecuador. As such, understanding the Ecuadorian experience can help contribute to the scholarly debate and refine existing theories.

The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a survey of the scholarly literature on models of electoral system change, highlighting scholars' tendency to view parties as the primary agents of reform and electoral maximization as their primary motivation. Using the Ecuadorian experience as a springboard, I then develop a coalition-based theory of electoral system change conditional on political regime type. To evaluate this coalition theory, I heed Kreuzer's (2010) admonishment and call for more careful historical, qualitative work to understand electoral change, and reconstruct the dominant actors and the interests behind seven key moments of electoral change in Ecuadorian history: 1830, 1861, 1929, 1947, 1979, 1997, and 2020. As predicated by the theory, electoral change under authoritarian or weakly democratic conditions from the foundation of the republic to 1979 was carried out by an "insulating coalition" of elites intended to protect the status quo as much as possible. However, since as democratic conditions improved, reforms were carried out by coalitions intent on breaking the status quo. The paper concludes with implication for comparative electoral system analysis as well as Ecuadorian politics.

2 Electoral System Change

There are dozens of explanations for electoral system adoption and reform in the comparative literature, considering a variety of actors with a variety of goals. Nearly of these understand politicians and parties as the fundamental agent of reform to maximize power, maintain power, or limit electoral losses (e.g., Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005). Boix (1999), Ahmed (2013), and others argue that parties in advanced democracies initially devised their electoral systems as exclusionary safeguards to protect pre-democratic elites from the impact of democratization and, particularly, the existential threat posed by working-class mobilization. By contrast, in the absence of an electoral threat from socialist parties, Calvo (2009, 256) explains reform as a function of established parties' interest in reducing

the vote-seat distortions that affected them when new parties entered the electoral arena.

In Latin America, Negretto and Visconti (2018) argue that in a context of limited party competition, the initial adoption of proportional representation (PR) was part of a strategy of controlled political liberalization promoted by authoritarian rulers. Following the conventional wisdom from Western Europe, Wills-Otero (2009) argues that the adoption of open electoral systems like PR in Latin America represented an effort by dominant parties to retain partial power in the face of changes in political conditions which threatened their hegemony. These threats took the form of an increase in the size of the electorate; the introduction of new political parties which challenged the dominant party; and shifts in the electorate's preferences away from the dominant party. Pluralitarian systems remained in places, like Mexico, when the incumbent party was strong enough to believe that it could gain a plurality of the votes despite these changes. Similarly, to explain post-third wave electoral changes in the region, Remmer (2008) shows that the rules of the electoral game tend to reflect the political self-interest of dominant political parties as defined in relation to mounting electoral uncertainty.

Research also highlights the role of partisan and non-partisan individuals. In the first case, some studies focus on intra-party struggles and the incentives of party elites to control their organizations or rank-and-file members to retain their seats (McElwain 2008). Similarly scholars also recognize that politicians do not necessarily act alone, and that non-political experts, judges, interest groups, and the public may pressure politicians or otherwise affect change (Renwick 2018). These non-party individuals may be motivated by personal gain (Benoit and Hayden 2004) or a desire to improve stability or representation (Gallagher 2005).

Experts also highlight the ways in which serendipity as well as conscious design can play a valuable role in the development of electoral institutions (Nagel 2004). Misunderstandings or misinterpretations of electoral laws have given birth to both unusual and enduring systems in Ireland (Gallagher 2005), Indonesia (Allen 2017), and Afghanistan (Reynolds 2006), among others.

As in most places, electoral system change in Ecuador involves many of these explanations. Scholars of Ecuadorian politics have invoked the roles of parties, elites, technocrats, history, regional diffusion, and chance to explain specific moments of change (Sánchez López 2006; Ortiz Ortiz 2020*b*), the evolution of the system in the democratic period (Pachano 2008; Ortiz Ortiz 2020*a*), or to describe the long-term evolution of the system over time (Albán Gómez 1989; Juárez and Navas 1993; Grijalva 1998; Reynoso 2019). However, few of these works explicitly engages the comparative literature on electoral system change, provides a framework for long-term change in the country, or can account for deviations from

the conventional assumptions in the comparative electoral systems literature.

3 A Coalitions-Based Theory

Instead of a purely party-based or individual-based explanation of institutional change, I argue that Ecuador’s electoral reforms, and most Ecuadorian institutional change writ large, is the consequence of shifting coalitions. This coalition-based theory adds to the conventional wisdom by loosening two assumptions: 1) that parties are the main actors in stable party systems; and 2) reforms tend to occur under democracy. Instead, I argue that coalitions may be composed of party or non-party actors. In fact, for the purposes of this paper, the term “coalition” refers to the range of groups and political actors that comprise “an organized attempt to get control of government” (Schattschneider 1942, 35). Reform becomes most likely when the composition of these coalitions changes and actors seek to retain power, gain power, or to pursue other policy ends.

Santucci (2022) recognizes a multiplicity of political actors in his examination of electoral reform in the United States. He proposes that changing coalitions tend to pursue three different types of reforms:

1. “Coalition-insulating reforms” led by the ruling coalition and meant to keep it in power. The first mode corresponds to cases in which some ruling coalition pursues reform unilaterally “from above” to grow power or to avoid defection from one of its constituent groups. This fits the standard “seat-maximizing” model of electoral reform, and therefore helps explain, for instance, conventional accounts of the adoption of PR as a mechanism to avoid authoritarian elites from the impact of democratization.
2. “Coalition-realigning reforms” led by those excluded from power, some of whom may be in the elected opposition. This essentially conforms to the idea of bottom-up reform or reform “from below” (Lutz 2004), in which some disadvantaged group or opposition leader cuts a reform deal with someone inside the ruling coalition. Santucci (2022) says that this typically involves building alliances with sympathetic legislators and/or helping third-party candidates get elected. These players can then demand concessions if they end up being pivotal to ruling-coalition initiatives.
3. “Polarizing reforms” led by the ruling coalition and its opposition to get rid of the existing system. Santucci (2022) emphasizes that these are not simply leaders of separate parties, but leaders of the coalitions that compete for control of government. He

says that beyond seat maximization, parties may be interested in other things such as policy and party brand.

In this formulation, reform is most likely when coalitions are shifting. This is because there is no reason to “insulate” unless actors perceive some threat to their power, no way to “realign” without sufficient demand for change, and no reason to “polarize” as long as the existing coalition structure is intact. This explanation may add explanatory power to the Ecuadorian case, where historically high electoral volatility produces an ever-shifting balance of power. In fact, if electoral reform is most common in periods of party system instability as Santucci maintains (2022), then this may explain why Ecuador, through decades of party system instability, has experienced near constant electoral changes.

To some extent, this is not a novel idea. Building off the work of Riker (1980), Benoit argues that, “electoral laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each party in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral institution, and that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative” (2004, 373–374). Yet there is a weakness with this conventional formulation. If electoral systems are redistributive bodies—zero-sum institutions, where the benefits of change to one party come at the expense of losses to another party—than parties in poorly institutionalized party systems may be less central to reform than in highly institutionalized ones. Instead, processes of electoral change are likely to involve collective actors such as political parties but also social movements and governments (Emmenegger and Petersen 2017).

Possibly because they were developed to explain electoral change in advanced industrial states, these theories all implicitly suppose that politics takes place under democratic conditions. However, this is clearly not always the case. In reality, electoral change often occurs under authoritarian conditions or only weakly democratic polities. This variable, the type of regime, should impact the ability of different coalitions to advocate for their cause. Specifically, authoritarianism should favor to those already in power and weaken the ability of social groups out of power, implying that reforms are more likely to be coalition-insulating. Bottom-up reforms pushed by those out of power are still possible, of course, but become less likely under more restrictive conditions due to possible restraints on a range of activities, from political participation to the right to public assembly.

All three types of these coalitions are likely under democracy, but it may also be the case that coalition-insulating reforms become more difficult the more fragmented and volatile the party system and politics become. In these cases, parties may not be able to think and calculate far into the future given the high degree of uncertainty. As a result, change is likely to be more idiosyncratic. With regards to Ecuador, this suggests that under democracy,

the country's weakly institutionalized and fragmented multiparty system makes it difficult for insulating coalitions to maximize their power or manipulate rules to manufacture single-party dominance. It can be done, as Alianza PAIS (AP) showed under Rafael Correa, but the high number of veto players and problems of collective action should impede easy coalition-insulating reforms. As such:

Hypothesis 1a *Under authoritarianism, elites pursue electoral changes to maximize their power or minimize their potential electoral losses in the face of extra-systemic challenges via coalition-insulating reforms.*

Hypothesis 1b *Under democracy, the presence of political fragmentation and weak party system institutionalization make parties less able to maximize their long-term interests, meaning that reform is more likely to take on a coalition-realigning or polarizing nature.*

In addition to providing a systematic framework for interpreting electoral reform regardless of regime type, this theory also helps explain seemingly counter-intuitive reforms under democracy. Specifically, the coalition-realigning nature of reforms may help explain how and why the country switched from closed list PR to block voting and free list PR in the late 1990s as well as the following shift from the free list back to them closed list in 2019—both changes that would seem damaging to the status quo.

This may be because reform necessarily involves negotiation over a series of issues in a multidimensionality policy space. Explaining New Zealand's adoption of MMP, Nagel observes that "because coalitions are formed through a process of explicit or implicit logrolling across issues, the policies that prevail with respect to any given issue are more likely to reflect the wishes of a passionate minority than the central tendency of the majority" (1998, 234). This should be especially true of coalition-realigning reforms. Indeed, Emmenegger and Walter (2019) emphasize that multidimensional policy spaces make electoral coalitions other than between nonsocialist parties possible, thus allowing disadvantaged parties to band together to challenge the dominant one. So, if reform efforts under democratization originate in realigning coalitions, then tradeoffs and logrolling across the country's notoriously ephemeral legislative coalitions are likely to play a large role. Consequently, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2 *In the absence of a stable and institutionalized party system, Ecuador's adoption of panachage in 1997 and then closed lists in 2020 were the products of coalition-realigning reforms and logrolling.*

4 A History of Electoral System Change

To evaluate these hypotheses, I select six key inflection points in evolution of the legislative electoral system (1830, 1863, 1929, 1945, 1997, 2019-2020), and one important moment without change (1978-1979). Nearly all of these occurred during periods of political tumult. As shown in 1, these occur under both democracy and dictatorship. I recognize that there are dozens of other moments of significant electoral system reform throughout the country's history: the adoption of the secret vote through the Electoral Law of 1900, the expansion of the vote to women through the 1929 Constitution (Article 13), the establishment of an impartial Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) to administer elections in the 1945 Constitution, and, finally, the establishment of universal voting in the 1978 Constitution by extending the franchise to citizens who were illiterate. However, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on broad reforms that changed, or failed to change, how votes are turned into seats for the lower house or unicameral assembly (whichever the case may be).




Figure 1: Democracy and electoral change (1830-2020)

Ecuador's electoral history has been marked by near constant reforms to its system (Albán Gómez 1989; Grijalva 1998; Pachano 1998, 2008). Table 1 summarizes, in broad

strokes, the evolution of the legislative electoral system from 1831 to 2021 (see Table A1 in the Supplemental Appendix for a complete election-by-election breakdown of the legislative electoral system during this period): indirect legislative representation based on geography from 1831; direct elections of representatives based on population and multiple votes and majoritarian electoral rules in 1863; the introduction of the limited vote in 1929; the advent of proportional representation under closed list rules in 1947; and the adoption of blocked lists upon re-democratization in 1979. For nearly this entire period, the party system was weak or nonexistent, and reform coalitions were made up of some combination of economic elites, powerful politicians, and/or military officers.

Table 1: Summary of electoral systems for Ecuadorian legislature (1831-2021)

Elections	Type	Levels	Chambers	Votes	Votes to seats	Electoral quotient
1831–1857	Indirect elections	1	2	N/A	By candidate	Plurality
1863–1924	Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1930–1943	Limited vote	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 7$	By candidate	Plurality
1948–1970	Closed list PR, unblocked	2	2	1	By party	Hare
1979–1996	Closed list PR, blocked	2	1	1	By party	Hare
1998	Bloc voting	2	1	M	By candidate	Plurality
2002	Free list PR	1	1	M	By party	D’Hondt
2006	Free list PR	1	1	M	By party	Imperiali
2009	Free list PR	2	1	M	By party	Imperiali
2013	Free list PR	2	1	M	By party	D’Hondt (provincial, Webster (national))
2017	Free list PR	2	1	M	By party	D’Hondt (provincial, Webster (national))
2021	Closed list PR	2	1	1	By party	Webster

Note: M=District magnitude; v=votes.

Source: Author, according to corresponding legislation.

Changes under democracy have been quite different and less predictable and reflect the logic of coalition-realigning or polarizing reforms. The adoption of majoritarian MNTV in 1998 and free list PR in 2002, and then the return to closed and unblocked lists in 2020 are the best examples of this. These changes were not mandated via executive fiat but packaged along with other significant policy changes and enjoyed support from civil society. The logic of these changes, stemming from the fragmentation of the party system and dissatisfaction with democracy, differs from previous reforms and does not necessarily benefit dominant parties or party elites. It also helps explain how and why the country re-adopted closed lists in 2021.

4.1 Indirect Elections and Censitary Majoritarianism

Upon independence, Ecuadorian elites adopted indirect elections to build a political system in which only they had access to the management and enjoyment of the state. Under these rules, citizens did not directly choose the highest authorities and officials, but rather members of collegial bodies, *Asambleas Parroquiales*, which proceeded to make the corresponding

designations (Albán Gómez 1989, 50). Although Article 11 of the Riobamba Constitution of 1830 recognized the right of “equality before the law and the option of electing and being elected” for all Ecuadorians, Article 12 established a series of requirements that severely curtailed *de facto* suffrage for electors, including: to be married and older than 22 years of age; to own real estate, hold wealth of at least 300 pesos—an enormous sum in the mid-nineteenth century—or exercise a useful profession or industry without working for others, and; to know how to read and write. This third requirement was especially restrictive, given that more than 90% of the Ecuadorian population during this time was illiterate (Hurtado 2009). This electoral system based on the economic qualification was known as censitary vote, since it had its origin in the old political institutions of Roman law, in which citizens were classified by the census according to their assets, and which conferred certain obligations and rights.¹

These rules were the result of a top-down, insulating coalition of oligarchs. Aldaz’s (2021) game-theoretic model of the institutional persistence and the absence of the franchise upon Ecuadorian independence explicitly incorporates coalition-building as an explanation for the indirect vote and censitary requirements. He shows that the ability of the country’s white economic elite to organize limited transfers to the non-elite obviated the need for democratizing reforms such as the extension of the franchise, suggesting an insulating coalition as the reason for country’s indirect voting system. This system clearly shielded those in power and limited the ability of potential opponents to obtain electoral triumphs. In fact, opposition exclusion helped incentive extreme solutions to political change in the form of coups d’état, which flourished during this time.

Notably, and in contrast to conventional accounts of reform coalitions, this alliance of actors was not party based. Indeed, the Ecuadorian party system of the nineteenth-century was nearly non-existent. The country did not possess modern permanent, national, or mass-based political parties, but rather political “societies” and “clubs” (Grijalva 1998). Indeed, the Liberal Party traces its origins to 1878, while the first effort to institutionalize a party organization was probably the founding of the Republican Society in 1883 (Ayala Mora 1978). Regardless, the early Liberal, Conservative, and Progressive parties were limited groups, lacking genuine organizations, mass identification, or loyalties (McDonald and Ruhl 1989). This also means that subsequent changes to the electoral system also consisted of non-party coalitions.

¹This was also the system adopted by the French revolutionary constitutions, those of Gran Colombia and, in general, the 19th century Spanish–American constitutions.

4.2 Direct Elections under Majoritarianism

In the wake of the civil war of 1859–1860 which nearly resulted in the dissolution of the country, the Garcian Period brought about the most consequential electoral reforms in nineteenth century Ecuador. Once again, this was the product of an insulating coalition, this time composed of conservative highland elites and clerics under the leadership of President Gabriel García Moreno. They were responsible for alterations in the 1861 Constitution which eliminated censitary requirements for voters, established direct popular elections for national office (Article 15), and instituted representation based on population and not geography (Article 24). Nonetheless, the 1861 Constitution continued to reflect its conservative authorship: it maintained age, civil status, and literacy requirements to vote (Article 8), while the 1869 Constitution imposed a requirement that all citizens be practicing Catholics (Article 10).

From this time until 1944, legislators were elected through by pluralitarian rules in single-member or multi-member districts (Albán Gómez 1989; Juárez and Navas 1993; Grijalva 1998). In plurinominal districts, this system took different forms of multiple non-transferable votes (MNTV): bloc voting, where voters possessed as many votes as representatives to be elected (1861–1929); and the limited vote, where voters possessed fewer votes than the number of representatives to be elected (1929–1944). In both cases, voters cast their votes for individuals instead of party lists and the winners were those with the greatest number of votes. Like other pluralitarian electoral systems, MNTV predates mass parties and was quite common across Latin America.² This is consistent with weak party organization and the proliferation of individual caudillos and personalistic movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries since voters choose among individuals rather than parties. In fact, if one knew nothing about the party system, the MNTV electoral system would suggest an inchoate party system in disarray (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005).

In the absence of modern political parties, García Moreno's coalition to realize these changes was composed of different sectors of the divided highland elite at a period of profound instability (Manguashca 1996). Although much has been written and debated about this alliance, historians generally consider to consist of highland landowners, members of the quiteño upper-class, and the Catholic Church (Quintero 1978; Ayala Mora 1981; Henderson 2008, 2009). García Moreno's reforms also benefited from the support of his trusted aide, General Juan José Flores and the army (Smith 1965). Together, these groups supported him because his regime combined political stability with relative economic progress, as well as an increase in military budget.

²Starting in 1900, Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán (2005) note that in addition to Ecuador, bloc vote was used in Brasil (1935–1936), Chile (1900–1923), Colombia (1900–1904), Guatemala (1914–1944), Panamá (1904–1917), Perú (1900–1913), and El Salvador (1900–1951).

This coalition is best characterized as insulating, since it protected the existing political rights privileged classes. The major change—the adoption of direct elections—reflected, in part, García Moreno’s modernizing attitudes (Sánchez López 1999). As originally sought by this quiteño elite to exercise greater power over Guayaquil and Cuenca, the 1861 Constitution established that political representation for deputies should be proportional to the population (Article 24). The requirement to be a practicing Catholic, likewise, reflected the García Moreno’s strong Catholicism, the influence of the Church in his government, and the religious conservatism of the quiteño upper class.

Aside from lifting the requirement to be a practicing Catholic in 1878, there were few major electoral reforms under the remainder of Conservative (1861–1875) or subsequent Progressive (1875–1895) or Alfarista/Liberal rule (1896–1925).

4.3 The July Revolution and the 1929 Constitution: Women’s Suffrage and the Limited Vote

The reformist July Revolution, carried out by junior military officers and directed at the hegemonic ‘bancocracy’ (*bancocracia*) and plutocratic liberal oligarchs in 1925, reflected a national aspiration for change. Nonetheless, the government of Isidro Ayora (1926–1931) instead marked a return to the pre-revolutionary status quo dominated by highland bankers, landowners, and political elites, as conservative politicians used the reforms advocated in the name of national unity and rehabilitation to wrest political control from Guayaquil to Quito (Cueva 1982; Paz y Miño Cepeda 2002). On the surface, the 1929 Constitution contained what seem like progressive electoral reforms that were the fruit of this bottom-up revolution: the expansion of the vote to women, functional representation, the first steps towards an independent electoral management body, and overtures to minority representation through introduction of the limited vote (Albán Gómez 1989).

In this case, Ayora’s coalition was made up of oligarchs of distinct ideological stripes—both *alfaristas* and *placistas*—which resisted leaving power and were careful of the emerging socialism (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2002). Perhaps surprisingly, the July Army (*Ejército juliano*) was also a fundamental pillar of support for the Ayora dictatorship until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly that proclaimed him president and dictated the 1929 Constitution (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2013). So, despite pressures from below, these changes reflected the preferences of power holders and helped to insulate elite power by maintaining the status quo.

For instance, reformers made suggestions of minority representation through the adoption

of the limited vote, as was done in other countries across the region,³ while maintaining the basic pluralitarian principles. Under these rules, voters cast votes for individuals in plurinomial districts, but they have fewer votes than the total number of elected representatives in the district (see Table A2 in the supplementary appendix for votes by district magnitude). This form of MNTV can enable smaller groupings to gain representation but remains highly disproportionate.

Likewise, the 1929 Constitution provided some representation for minorities through the functional representation of dignitaries within the Chamber of Deputies. Specifically, there were deputies who would watch over specific activities such as education, production, the peasantry, and the armed forces. Of course, this form of representation, which would also be enshrined in the 1945, 1946, and 1967 constitutions, offered a specific form of minority representation which tied these economic sectors to the state. Moreover, the extension of voting rights to women (1929 Constitution, Article 13) was not the product of a grassroots women’s rights or women’s suffrage movement as it was in other Latin American states. Instead, it seems to have been at least partially a response to the highland landowning elite and the Conservative Party, which would benefit from incorporating predominantly clerical and conservative women voters (Quintero 1980).

4.4 The Glorious May Revolution and the 1947 Electoral Law: From Electoral Majoritarianism to PR

The causes, effects, and revolutionary nature of the “Glorious Revolution” of May 1944 and the subsequent Velasquista counterrevolution have been vigorously debated (e.g., Vega Ugalde 1987; Cabrera Hanna 2016). What is clear is that *la Gloriosa*, a bottom-up military-civic rebellion, marked the advent of major electoral system reforms and the dawning of mass politics in Ecuador. The rebellion was carried out by a coalition of diverse political parties and civil society organizations aimed at dislodging President Carlos Arroyo del Río and Liberal dominance. However, it was subsequent coalition-insulating electoral reforms under President José María Velasco Ibarra which permanently altered the Ecuadorian political system and introduced mass politics through compulsory voting for eligible men and optional voting for eligible women (1946 Constitution, Article 22; 1947 Elections Law, Article 83), a national electoral body (1945 Constitution, Articles 21-22; 1946 Constitution, Articles 23-25), and perhaps most importantly, the adoption of closed list proportional representation

³As with the indirect vote and then bloc voting, the limited vote was used across the region, including Bolivia (1924–1950), Brazil (1900–1929), Colombia (1905–1930), Ecuador (1932–1944) and Panama (1918–1927)(Wills Otero and Pérez-Liñán 2005).

to guarantee minority representation (1947 Elections Law, Articles 88 and 105).

The impetus for these changes was among the largest social mobilizations in the country's history. With a deteriorating economic situation and a growing fear that Arroyo del Río would not respect the outcome of the upcoming June 1944 elections, popular pressure grew for political change. On May 28, 1944, a broad coalition of civilians and young military officers joined forces to overthrow the increasingly unpopular president. After days of pressure, Arroyo del Río resigned on May 31, ending nearly fifty years of Liberal hegemony (Cueva 1982, 39). As a result of this insurrection, former president Velasco Ibarra came to power for his second administration, which lasted from June 1944 to August 1947. As Becker writes, "it was a time of euphoric optimism which seemed to signal the emergence of new social relations and the end of exclusionary state structures" (2003, 1–2).

This multi-class coalition responsible for the rebellion, however, was different from the more conservative groups ultimately responsible for the electoral reforms. In July 1943, in preparation for the elections planned for June 1944, most political parties and associations of civil society had joined forces to form the *Alianza Democrática Ecuatoriana* (ADE) against the *Partido Liberal Radical* and in support of Velasco Ibarra. The ADE's support ran the ideological gamut and included the *Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano* (PCE), *Partido Comunista*, *Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano* (PSE), *Vanguardia Socialista Revolucionaria*, *Partido Liberal Independiente*, and the *Frente Democrático*, to say nothing of students, workers, peasants, and other elements of civil society (de la Torre 1994; Cabrera Hanna 2016). This coalition held a dominant position in drafting the 1945 Constitution: Socialists held 33 of 100 delegates, the PCE 24, and the Communists nine (Becker 2000).

However, the 1945 charter was short-lived. The heterogeneous composition of the ADE led to conflicts and desertions: the Conservatives were the first to leave in 1945, followed by the Socialists shortly thereafter. As opposition to his government mounted, Velasco Ibarra launched an autogolpe with the backing of the PCE and the Armed Forces on March 30, 1946. These groups quickly moved to form another constituent assembly, meeting between August 10 and December 31, 1946. Unlike the constituent assembly a year earlier, this one was dominated by the PCE, which pursued more tempered reforms than those initially carried out in 1945 (Ayala Mora 1989, 48). Ecuador's shift to PR, then, was more a controlled top-down reform from this authoritarian coalition, than the bottom-up change envisioned by more leftist components of the ADE. Fittingly, this is consistent with Negretto and Visconti (2018), who argue that in a context of limited party competition, the initial adoption of PR in Latin America was part of a strategy of controlled political liberalization promoted by authoritarian rulers.

4.5 Democratization and the Retention of Closed List PR

The Constitution of 1979 eliminated the longstanding literacy requirement and ushered in universal voting (Article 33), and also established a unicameral Congress (Article 56) to provide agility to the legislature (Ayala Mora 1995). The Elections Law of 1978, meanwhile, maintained closed list PR (Articles 3 and 83-86) and instituted two-round elections for the presidency in the event that no candidate obtained an absolute majority in the first round (Article 79-81). As with the electoral changes in the 1945-1946 period, these electoral reforms—or in the case of PR, the continuation of previous rules—were the consequence of an insulating coalition under authoritarianism eager to manage the country’s transition to democracy and shape the (new) party system.

The military’s Supreme Governing Council that assumed power in 1976 paved the way for re-democratization. To create its legal framework, it established three commissions: One to draft a new constitution, another to reform the 1945 Constitution, and the third to structure the party system. Although the first two of these options were submitted to an approving referendum in 1978 where voters selected the new constitution, military oversight meant that the electoral rules put in place reflected their preferences (Corkill 1985; Isaacs 1993). Specifically, the triumvirate appointed a Civilian Judicial Committee (*Comisión Jurídica de Civiles*) headed by Osvaldo Hurtado to draw up party and election laws, and did not promulgate said laws without first adding transitory provisions that prevented the participation of former presidents (e.g. José María Velasco Ibarra, Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy) or the former mayor of Guayaquil, Assad Bucaram (Martz 1987).

The general objective of these reforms was to organize and regulate political activity, simplify the number of parties, and stabilize the political system (Escobar et al. 2010; Freidenberg and Pachano 2016). Closed and blocked list PR was chosen to help reconstruct the political party system which had proven so troublesome in the 1960s (Ortiz Ortiz 2020a). In that time, caudillismo, the proliferation of political options, and the ephemeral nature of the governing coalitions (e.g., Pyne 1976) were obstacles to the consolidation of democratic institutions. So, despite delegating electoral system design to the Civilian Judicial Committee, the re-adoption of closed list PR was a carefully managed, top-down policy more reflective of a coalition-insulating reform than a coalition-realigning or polarizing one.

4.6 From Closed lists to Open Ones: Logrolling toward an Unintended Electoral System

Since its re-democratization, Ecuador has witnessed constant changes to its electoral system (Pachano 2008; Ortiz Ortiz 2020a), including the adoption of panachage, or vote-mixing, in

1997 and a return to closed lists in 2020. Unlike the majority of carefully managed, top-down, coalition-insulating electoral changes in the country's authoritarian history, these reforms under democracy have been coalition-realigning changes that have not clearly benefitted the ruling parties. In both cases studied here, reformers exploited the fragmentation of the political system to logroll through the reforms.

The adoption of panachage, which manifested itself as bloc vote in 1998 and free list PR from 2002 to 2017, was the first example of this. In the 1990s, many social actors and institutional designers began to believe that closed and blocked lists contributed to an inaccessible and poorly representative party system which closed access to political office for more Ecuadorians (Verdesoto 2005). However, direct proposals submitted to society failed to change this: in a Popular Consult in November 1995, 60% of voters rejected a shift from PR to single-member district plurality elections, a measure supported by the government of President Sixto Durán Ballén as well as the *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC) (TSE 1997a). Nonetheless, a new opportunity for change arose in early 1997 after the National Congress removed President Abdalá Bucaram from office on the charge of mental incapacity after only six months in office. Bucaram's successor, Fabián Alarcón, quickly convened a Popular Consult on April 6, 1997, to legitimize his rule and seek the endorsement of the military (Verdesoto and Ardaya 2018, 36).

If the political crisis and its aftermath created conditions ripe for political reform, the popular consult provided the means. The consult questions and political reforms were spearheaded by interim Minister of Government César Verduga, and its Committee for the Restructuring of the Ecuadorian State (*Comisión de Reestructuración del Estado del Ecuador*). The committee, which was supported by many of the same forces that had protested against Bucaram, including workers unions and the left, made recommendations for what questions would make up the May 25 consult. The major parties did not necessarily support a shift to open lists. Instead, the idea behind question six, relating to the electoral system, was to give voters more choice by moving from closed lists, associated with party hegemony, a large state, and the poor representation that resulted in the Bucaram crisis, to open list PR (Verdesoto 1997b).⁴ Personalization of the system, of course, would decrease party leaders' control over list order and weaken parties by allowing independents the ability to participate.

The poorly worded consult question ended up giving institutional engineers more than they bargained for, resulting in the complex system that would last more than 20 years. It read:

⁴Verdesoto (1997a) himself proposed a mixed system that was never seriously considered by the committee.

For the election of deputies, municipal counselors, and provincial counselors, which of the following two election alternatives do you prefer?

- a. Voting for complete lists, like now.
- b. Voting by choosing names from each list among lists.

(TSE 1997*a*, 99)

What this meant was certainly not clear to voters. Pollster Jaime Durán Barba noted that, “a high percentage of them do understand the topic and randomly pick one option or another” (Durán Barba 1997, 91).⁵ The results bore this out: voters weakly preferred the candidate-centered option, with 30.79% of voters choosing it versus 28.73% for the closed list status quo, 12.9% blank, and a whopping 27.56% null (TSE 1997*b*).

Nor was it clear to electoral authorities, who could not agree on how to interpret the winning proposal for voters to choose names “from each list among lists”. By all indications, the committee intended to present conventional open list PR as the alternative to closed lists. However, pluralization of the word “names” led the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) to adopt the Swiss and Luxembourgish panachage system, where voters are given up to M votes (where M is the number of seats in the district) to choose among candidates within or across party lists. The country used bloc voting for the 1998 elections, and after extreme fragmentation, moved to pool votes at the party level before distributing seats beginning in 2002 through the free list. Many designers lamented this unanticipated system. In its aftermath, Verdesoto characterized the question as “certainly worded mistakenly” (Verdesoto 1997*a*, 24) and later advocated relentlessly to eliminate the multiple vote system.

This reform passed, in part, because it was folded into the legitimizing reforms for Alarcón as a form of logrolling. Instead of being introduced and supported by the major political parties, it was proposed by consultants in a moment of crisis and endorsed by voters in a popular consult. So, while the movement towards open lists is consistent with what scholars know about electoral reform (Renwick and Pilet 2016), it appears quite likely that Ecuador’s novel adoption of bloc voting and then free list PR were accidents: the byproducts of a coalition-realigning reform dissatisfied with closed lists combined with a lack of precision regarding the type of open lists to replace them.

⁵Note, furthermore, that Barba speaks of a choice between uninominal choices or lists—not the choice of multiple candidates across lists.

4.7 Rectifying Mistakes: A Polarizing Coalition and the Return to Closed List PR

It is rare for electoral system to de-personalize (Renwick and Pilet 2016). Within classes of proportional representation, the tendency is to move from closed lists to more open ones (e.g., flexible list, open list, or free list)—something that makes Ecuador’s 2019-2020 reform from free to closed quite remarkable. On the surface, such a party strengthening reform would appear to be coalition-insulating. However, change originated in non-party actors and was supported by the ruling coalition and its opposition to get rid of the existing system, representing an example of a “polarizing coalition”. In this case, individuals in the National Electoral Council (CNE), civil society actors, and enough political parties agreed, and the National Assembly approved reforms to the Democratic Code in February 2020.

The origin of this last set of reforms derives from the failures of the 1997 system and the virtual collapse of the party system. As early as 2015, civil society actors and members of the CNE’s Laws Committee had circulated a draft bill proposing closed lists for pluripersonal elections and the adoption of the Webster formula for assigning seats (Celi R. 2015). The latter was motivated by a legal ruling against the legality of the D’Hondt formula as well as perceptions that D’Hondt overrepresented Rafael Correa’s Alianza PAIS (AP) (Noboa 2016). Facing an AP supermajority in the National Assembly that was opposed to the reform package, however, this proposal went nowhere. In May 2017, after the election of President Lenín Moreno, the legislature considered a bill related to the Organic Electoral Law and of Political Organizations (LOEOP), although this proposal did not include list, voting, district, or quotient modifications (Ortiz Ortiz 2020a).

The reform proposals gained steam with two key developments: the designation of five new magistrates to the CNE in November 2018, including reformer Luis Verdesoto; and the creation of the multisectorial Table of Democracy and Institutional Reform as a part of the government’s National Agreement Ecuador 2030 in May 2019. The Table of Democracy gathered proposals from at least six different sectors to be processed by the National Assembly’s Justice Committee, including input from civil society organizations such as the Esquel Foundation, Grupo FARO, *Fundación Ciudadana y Desarrollo*, and *Participación Ciudadana*, all of which supported a return to closed lists (*Civil Society Leads Democracy Code Reform for Ecuador* 2019). From the CNE, Verdesoto was a relentless advocate for eliminating panachage, arguing in public fora and on social media for the need to “reunite the vote, eliminating the fragmentation in mixing among lists” (Verdesoto 2019). Ultimately, the organization sent three reform proposals: one from the *Correista* bloc (President Diana Atamaint, Esthela Acero, and José Cabrera), a second from Enrique Pita and Verdesoto,

and a third from the Election Disputes Tribunal (TCE) (*Reforma electoral en Ecuador se alista en Mesa de la Democracia* 2019).

After much debate, legislators passed a reform bill on December 3, 2019, which closely conformed to the proposals suggested by civil society and Pita-Verdesoto (Velez 2019). Crucially, this included the elimination of panachage and the return to closed list PR, as well as a change of vote allocation method from D'Hondt to Webster, supported by AP, Creo, and independents, and opposed by Correa's *Revolución Ciudadana* bloc and the PSC. Other reforms were more popular, such as promoting gender parity by requiring 50% of party lists to be headed by women and for presidential binomials to be comprised of a man and a woman, and the implementation of a system for the transparency of campaign contributions. In total, 160 Code of Democracy articles were reformed (Velez 2019).

This “polarizing coalition”, a combination of reformers from civil society and the CNE in conjunction with major political parties, was made possible by the generalized dissatisfaction with the prevailing electoral and party system. This certainly included constitutional and logistical problems with the fractionalization of the vote contained in the free list, as well as concerns over the fairness of the method of seat allocation, transparency of political parties, and more. At the same time, the 2020 reform also conforms to Shugart's (2001) hypothesis that electoral systems that are extreme on the interparty dimension, intraparty dimension, or both are inherently prone to reformist pressures.

5 Comparative Case Analysis

Given the diversity of actors and goals, it is often difficult to systematize explanations of electoral system reform over long periods of time. This is especially true of Ecuador, which has adopted several different electoral systems over time and oscillated between party-centered and highly personalized list types under PR in the democratic period. Despite covering 190 years of electoral reform, however, the seven cases above illustrate important commonalities—and differences. To begin, many of the most radical changes in electoral matters occurred in critical moments of social or political crisis, suggesting a degree of elite responsiveness regardless of the regime in place. Further, it shows how electoral engineering has been viewed as a tool to mitigate broader social or political problems.

As to be expected from Ecuador's late-forming and then largely inchoate party system, political parties were not always at the center of the reform proposals. Instead, dictators, political and economic elites, the Catholic Church, the armed forces, electoral authorities, and civil society actors were all protagonists in these changes. As summarized in Table 2, five cases reflected a process of top-down, coalition-insulating reforms; one case was a

bottom-up, coalition-realigning reform; and a final case reflected a polarizing reform. In some instances, such as the 1946–1947 and 1978–1979 periods, civil society and political parties across the ideological spectrum played important roles in exercising vertical and horizontal pressure on the military and/or dominant political actors which would seem to suggest a coalition-realigning or polarizing process. Nonetheless, the reforms themselves were carefully monitored and approved by authoritarian power holders, suggesting that they fit better into the coalition-insulating framework.

Table 2: Summary of highlighted reformist coalitions (1830-2020)

Year	Reform	Actors supporting reform	Reform coalition
Authoritarianism			
1830	Indirect elections	Economic elites; Non-elites	Insulating
1863	Direct elections	Quiteño elite; Catholic church	Insulating
1929	Limited vote	President Isidro Ayora; Oligarchy; Armed forces	Insulating
1945	Proportional representation	President José Maréa Velasco Ibarra; Partido Conservador Ecuatoriano; Armed forces	Insulating
1979	Maintain closed lists	Supreme Council of Government; Civilian Judicial Committee	Insulating
Democracy			
1997	Open lists and panachage	Ecuadorian Committee of State Restructuring	Realigning
2020	Return to closed lists	Civil society; some magistrates of the National Electoral Council; Political parties	Polarizing

The cases support the hypotheses. As predicted by H1, Ecuadorian elites pursued reforms under authoritarianism in the face of extra-systemic challenges via insulating coalitions intended to keep them in power. As Paz y Miño Cepeda writes, “between the Constitution of 1830 and that of 1929... Ecuadorian constitutions reflected and at the same time guaranteed an oligarchic–landholding republic” (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2007, 3). All significant reforms during this period conform to expectations of what top-down, coalition-insulating change to protect entrenched elites’ interest would look like under authoritarianism—including the shift to proportional representation after the events of the Glorious May Revolution of 1944. Conversely, under democracy, hegemonic actors in the country’s weakly institutionalized party system were less likely to be able to protect and advance their long-term interests,

making coalition-realigning and polarizing reforms more likely and supporting H2. Consequently, seemingly unexpected reforms, such as the adoption of free list PR, make more sense.

6 Conclusions

Building off a long tradition of scholarship, I propose a coalitions-based theory to understand electoral system change. Specifically, I argue that reforms throughout Ecuador's history can be understood as a function of different types of reformist coalitions. Unlike other scholars, however, I emphasize that 1) reformist coalitions in inchoate party systems may include non-party actors, and 2) that the likelihood of certain coalitions emerging is dependent on the political regime. Under authoritarianism, coalition-insulating reforms are more likely, while under democracy, political fragmentation and weak party system institutionalization made parties less able to maximize their long-term interests, meaning that reform was more likely to take a coalition-realigning or polarizing nature.

This framework helps explain not only how the Ecuadorian case closely followed other Latin American ones before 1979 through adoption of the direct vote, then the limited vote, and then proportional representation, but also why it diverged in the democratic period. While reform under authoritarianism reflected the conventional wisdom of political (and economic) actors seeking to maximizing their power, this was not the case since re-democratization. Instead, reform reflected a mix of actors and interests. The ability of non-party actors to effect change through folding a reform proposal into the 1997 Popular Consult is one such example.

More generally, the Ecuadorian experience demonstrates some of the limits of conventional theories of electoral change. For instance, it is necessary to recognize that the protagonists of electoral system change are not always political parties. Instead, a coalition-based theory may be better at explaining changes in inchoate party systems than existing theories that assume hegemonic parties and programmatic party systems. In this way, electoral change is possible through several causal channels.

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Supplemental Appendix

Table A1: Evolution of the Ecuadorian Electoral System

Year	Sen	Prov	Nat	Type	Levels	Chmbr	v	Votes to seats	Quotient
1831		✓		Indirect election	1	1		By candidate	Plurality
1837	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1841	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1846	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1848	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1851				Indirect election	1	1		By candidate	Plurality
1853	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1855	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1857	✓	✓		Indirect election	1	2		By candidate	Plurality
1863	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1865	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1867	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1870	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1876		✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1880	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1885	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1889	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1891	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1893	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1898	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1900	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1902	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1904	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1908	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1910		✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1912	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1914		✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1916	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1918		✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1920	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1922		✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1924	✓	✓		Bloc voting	1	2	M	By candidate	Plurality
1930	✓	✓		Indirect election, limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 7$	By candidate	Plurality
1932		✓		Indirect election, limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 7$	By candidate	Plurality
1934	✓	✓		Indirect election, limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 7$	By candidate	Plurality
1939	✓	✓		Limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 8$	By candidate	Plurality
1941		✓		Limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 8$	By candidate	Plurality
1943	✓	✓		Limited voting	2	2	$1 \leq v \leq 8$	By candidate	Plurality
1948	✓	✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1950		✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1952	✓	✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1954		✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1956	✓	✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1958		✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1960	✓	✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1962		✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1968	✓	✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1970		✓		CLPR, unblocked	2	2	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1979		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1984		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1986		✓		CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1988		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1990		✓		CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1992		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1994		✓		CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1996		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Hare, largest remainders
1998		✓	✓	Bloc voting	2	1	M	By candidate	Plurality
2002		✓		FLPR	1	1	M	Pooling by party	D'Hondt
2006		✓		FLPR	1	1	M	Pooling by party	Imperiali, largest remainders
2009		✓	✓	FLPR	2	1	M	Pooling by party	Imperiali, largest remainders
2013		✓	✓	FLPR	2	1	M	Pooling by party	D'Hondt, Webster
2017		✓	✓	FLPR	2	1	M	Pooling by party	D'Hondt, Webster
2021		✓	✓	CLPR, blocked	2	1	1	Pooling by party	Webster

Note: Sen=Senators, Prov=Provincial desputies, Nat=National deputies, v=votes, Chmbr=Chambers, M=District magnitude, CLPR=Closed list proportional representation, FLPR=Free list proportional representation

Table A2: Number of votes under the limited vote (1929–1945)

Magnitude	Votes
1	1
2	2
3	2
4	3
5	4
6	4
7	5
8	6
9	6
10	7
11	8

Note: This district magnitude and corresponding number of votes was added through the Electoral Law of 1939