
Bureaucracy in Latin America

John Polga-Hecimovich

Subject: Governance/Political Change, Policy, Administration, and Bureaucracy, Political Institutions

Online Publication Date: Sep 2019 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1675

Summary and Keywords

The bureaucracy is a central body in the effective functioning of democracy and oversight of the rule of law, and knowledge of how public agencies interact with politics and effect policy implementation is crucial in understanding the “black box” of the state. However, this body of non-elected officials can only fulfill its mandate and achieve good governance if it meets certain conditions, such as technical expertise, a clear organizational hierarchy, meritocratic recruitment for personnel staffing, as well as political support, resources, and the autonomy to devise solutions based on expertise. Unfortunately for Latin America, its bureaucratic agencies have seldom enjoyed these conditions. Instead, public administration in the region has been characterized by patronage appointments, patrimonialism, and a weak capacity to execute public policies.

Yet this blanket depiction of the Latin American bureaucracy obscures a great deal more diversity—as well as the fact that Latin American bureaucrats and public agencies are more dynamic and responsive than they are often portrayed. To begin, the size and role of the public administration have evolved constantly throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, growing under statist development policies of the mid-20th century before shrinking under neoliberalism in the 1990s and again growing during the 2000s in some countries. Moreover, the quality of the bureaucracy to efficiently provide services and implement policy varies by country, over time, and even within countries among agencies. This means that there is also variation in the scope and quality of the bureaucracy’s chief functions of policymaking, regulation, and implementation. In fact, politicians and bureaucrats in the region have found a number of creative solutions to agency weakness. Moving forward, politicians can guarantee even better bureaucratic performance by addressing some enduring challenges, such as public sector corruption and an institutional setup that favors short-term policymaking.

Keywords: Latin American, bureaucracy, public administration, policymaking, regulation, implementation, public agencies, Latin American politics

The executive branch of government under presidential political systems in Latin America is an actor charged with designing, enforcing, and executing laws. In democracies, elected political officials in the legislature or the president and her cabinet engage in public policy design while the government bureaucracy or public administration is entrusted to implement that policy. However, the role of this organization—or network of organizations—goes beyond mere implementation, since the bureaucracy prepares, executes, controls, and evaluates public policies as it runs the government, while also exercising oversight of certain private sector spheres. Accordingly, the bureaucracy is a central body in the effective functioning of the democratic system and oversight of the rule of law.

However, the bureaucracy can only fulfill its mandate if it meets certain conditions, such as technical expertise, a clear division of labor, well-defined rules and procedures, a strict chain of command, and meritocratic recruitment (Weber, 1947/2012) as well

as political support, resources, and the autonomy to devise solutions based on expertise. Effective public administration, therefore, requires a Weberian bureaucratic foundation as well as an effective political process to support it. Unfortunately, the bureaucracy has seldom enjoyed these conditions in Latin America. Instead, scholars, politicians, and citizens have long described the Latin American bureaucracy as inefficient and bloated (e.g., Ames, 1987), given the prominence of patronage appointments, patrimonialism, and a weak capacity to execute public policies.

Yet this portrayal is, at best, incomplete: The size and role of the public administration have evolved constantly throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, growing under statist development policies of the mid-20th century before shrinking under neoliberalism in the 1990s (and despite the emergence of regulatory agencies in the region during that time) and again growing during the 2000s in some countries. Moreover, the quality of the bureaucracy to efficiently provide services and implement policy varies by country, over time, and even within countries among agencies. This means that there is also variation in the scope and quality of the bureaucracy's chief functions of policymaking, regulation, and implementation. In fact, politicians and bureaucrats in the region have often found creative solutions to agency weakness. Of course, some problems, such as corruption, persist, but Latin American bureaucrats and public agencies are probably more dynamic and responsive than they are often portrayed.

This article proceeds as follows. The first section (“DEVELOPMENT AND SIZE OF LATIN AMERICAN BUREAUCRACIES”) traces the development and evolution of Latin American bureaucracies, with a focus on public sector employment, the role of the state, and distinctive characteristics of the region's administrative apparatus (e.g., the ubiquity of state-owned enterprises). Although the bureaucracy and the state are conceptually distinct, the public bureaucracy contributes to the development of and is a central manifestation of the state and state power, and here and elsewhere reference is made to each of them. The second section (“THE QUALITY OF LATIN AMERICAN BUREAUCRACIES”) describes the quality and effectiveness of bureaucracies in the region, exploring inter-country and intra-country variation as well as attempts at administrative reform. The third section (“WHAT LATIN AMERICAN BUREAUCRACIES DO”) summarizes the three fundamental tasks of Latin American bureaucracies—policy design, regulation, and policy implementation—with a focus on how the nature of these activities may diverge from the developed world. The fourth section (“CHALLENGES”) then focuses on two recurring problems to be addressed, specifically public sector corruption and politically generated uncertainty, which continue to detract from bureaucratic effectiveness across countries.


Development and Size of Latin American Bureaucracies

The legacy of Latin America's Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage facilitated the development of inflexible, rule-bound bureaucracies in the region. Specifically, the networks of regulations, licenses, official monopolies, and quotas helped create an omnipresent state and a tangle of bureaucratic red tape in the colonial Americas. Worse, this highly procedural and hierarchical system was not designed to be efficient. Accordingly, there was a great deal of continuity between colonial and postcolonial governance, and state-led national development strategies after independence reinforced this prevailing orthodoxy (Whitehead, 1994).

Bureaucratization and state building varied by region and by country, so while census taking, court building, chorography, and tax collection contributed to the development of public administrations in some states (Centeno & Ferraro, 2013), not even the establishment of national militaries was sufficient for state building in others (like the small states of Central America) (Thies, 2006; Mahoney, 2013). In other words, Latin America offers evidence that the size and strength of the state may not necessarily be related: States can be strong and weak or small and strong, too. Nor did bureaucratization necessarily equal modernization: Although state building and national development efforts in the 19th and early 20th centuries helped spur the creation of a

“modern” administrative apparatus in places like Argentina and Mexico, political leaders’ personal patronage systems and kinship relations still largely held these structures together (Garavaglia & Ruiz, 2013).

There was similar variation in the size of the public administration across countries over the course of the 20th century. In most places, the state was fairly small until the 1930s or 1940s. During the postwar period, however, a number of larger countries pursued the statist policy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) in a quest for rapid industrialization and national economic development. During this time, the public sector expanded quickly in places with big domestic markets, like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and instruments of coordination were developed through the concentration of economic power (Hirschman, 1968). As Figure 1 shows, public sector employment as a percentage of all employment in 10 Latin American countries increased from between 2% and 10% in 1950 to between 5% and 23% in 1965 and 1980. In essence, by prioritizing the development of their bureaucracies, Latin American governments created more complex administrative structures than in the United States.



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 1. Public sector employment as a percentage of all employment (1950–1986). Adapted from Whitehead (1994).

However, the size of the state began to shrink during the wave of neoliberal economic reforms and corresponding state reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Following measures proposed by the Washington Consensus to create a more limited and fiscally disciplined state and transfer development impetus to market forces, countries dramatically reduced the share of workers employed in the public sector (Echebarría & Cortázar, 2007). The biggest differences came in Bolivia, where the share of public sector workers dropped from 21% in 1990 to 12% in 1997, Costa Rica (from 24% in 1983 to 16% in 1997), Honduras (from 13% in 1989 to 9% in 1998), Panama (from 27% in 1991 to 22% in 1997), Uruguay (from 25% in 1989 to 19% in 1997), and Venezuela (from 23% in 1981 to 16% in 1997) (Panizza, 2001). Notably, recent transformations of Latin American bureaucracies have generally been the result of economic and fiscal reform rather than products of reform strategies directly focused on public management (Lora, 2006).


Privatization and state reform, however, have not eliminated one particularity of Latin American bureaucracies: the heavy presence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), businesses where the state exercises significant control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. Governments steered away from full privatization due to its political cost, since oftentimes service quality and coverage did not meet the standards set out by regulators or because public monopolies became private monopolies (Chong & López-de-Silanes, 2005). As a result, the number of SOEs per country today range from 13 in Paraguay to 90 in Mexico and 128 in Brazil, often in the oil and gas industries, and average SOE output by country accounts for a whopping 15% of GDP (Musacchio, Pineda Ayerbe, & García, 2015).

Public sector employment and public sector budgets, two measures of the size of the bureaucracy, increased again in the 2000s and 2010s in left-leaning countries that adopted strategies of what some refer to as “post-neoliberalism.” As used by scholars such as Macdonald and Ruckert (2009), this developmental paradigm maintains elements of neoliberalism’s export-led growth model, yet also advocates wealth redistribution by the state and asserts the state’s central role in planning and development. Importantly, the election of leftist governments that pursued this state-led development strategy coincided with rising commodity prices and an export boom that allowed them to govern as they wanted, unencumbered by balance-of-payments and fiscal pressures (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). Consequently, the size of the public sector grew under the populist presidencies of Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006–present [2019]), Rafael Correa (2007–2017) in Ecuador, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) in Venezuela, as well as that of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015) in Argentina (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012). Correa’s government, for example, more than doubled the number of public servants in the country between 2003 and 2011 from 230,185 to 510,430 (Iacoviello, 2006, 2014).¹

However, this growth is not likely to last in all of the aforementioned countries. In Ecuador, Lenín Moreno’s adoption of fiscal austerity since taking office in 2017 has cut the size of the state, resulting in a “thinning” that has reduced the number of government ministries and employees (Sánchez & Polga-Hecimovich, 2019). Similar processes have taken place in Argentina under the government of Mauricio Macri (Bronstein, 2016), while it is too early to speculate what might happen after Evo Morales leaves office in Bolivia and the *Chavismo* finally loses power in Venezuela.

Working in the public sector offers advantages over the private sector, especially for women and less-educated employees. Panizza (2001) finds that Latin American public sector compensation is consistent with global trends: Public workers in the region often receive both higher wages and higher non-wage compensation than private sector workers; the wage premium is higher for women than it is for men; and the premium is inversely correlated with earnings, meaning that low-wage earners, who also tend to have less education, earn a higher premium than better-educated and higher-wage earners. This may be, in part, a consequence of high union membership in the public sector or hiring and firing constraints.

Despite the persistence of SOEs, post-neoliberal reforms in at least a few states, and the public sector premium for workers, Latin America’s public sector today is actually not much larger than its U.S. equivalent—and in many places is even smaller. As Figure 2 shows, public sector employment as a percentage of overall employment in the 2010s is highest in Argentina, at just over 18%, followed by the United States at 17%, and then the remaining four Latin American countries with available data, with public sector employment in Paraguay accounting for less than 10% of total employment. Furthermore, these relative rankings are consistent with more complete regional data from the 2000s (Arceneaux, 2013).



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 2. Public sector employment as a percentage of overall employment. Adapted from ILOSTAT Database, International Labor Organization (2018).


The Quality of Latin American Bureaucracies

Bureaucratic Effectiveness

To guarantee stability in public policy outcomes, bureaucracies must possess organizational capacity or attributes that contribute to organizational effectiveness. Bureaucratic capacity (and autonomy) is conceptually distinct from state capacity, although there is quite a bit of overlap (Hendrix, 2010). For the government, this generally refers to the ability to carry out legislation or policy directives as established by politicians. A large swath of the established scholarship is informed by U.S. or Western European experiences (e.g., Downs, 1967; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) and therefore assumes high organizational capacity as a given. Nonetheless, this assumption rarely holds in Latin America or other parts of the developing world (Rauch & Evans, 2000; Cárdenas, 2010; Grindle, 2012). On the contrary, most Latin American public agencies suffer from a variety of weaknesses that impact their organizational capacity, including low channels of meritocratic recruitment, accountability, transparency, probity, and predictable long-term careers—all necessary attributes to maximize competence (Grindle, 1997).

Standardized cross-national indicators of bureaucratic capacity and government effectiveness reflect these negative characterizations. Figure 3 plots the World Governance Indicators (WGI) “government effectiveness” score, which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies, from 1996 to 2017 across all Latin American countries and Puerto Rico. The 2017 scores place Chile (despite a recent drop), Uruguay, and Costa Rica—the three countries in the region with arguably the strongest democratic institutions—as the regional pacesetters. Conversely, Venezuelan government effectiveness has fallen from an already low point in the 1990s, passing Paraguay on its way to the ignominy of the lowest ranking in the region. The other lowest scoring countries include the Central American states of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Figure 3 also shows that government effectiveness is relatively static—or stagnant. There has been improvement in Colombia, Cuba, and El Salvador over the 20-year period, with declines in Puerto Rico and Venezuela during that same time and little movement in other places.

A study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) that computes public sector performance (PSP) and public sector efficiency (PSE) indicators for Latin American and Caribbean countries reaches similar conclusions. The report finds Venezuela and Nicaragua to have the least efficient and least effective public sectors, and Chile and Guatemala to have the most efficient and most effective ones (Afonso, Romero, & Monsalve, 2013). The only somewhat surprising finding is Guatemala ranking next to Chile, with high PSP and PSE, considering its low standing on the WGI scale. This may be because, unlike the government efficiency scores, which reflect perceptions of patronage versus merit-based staffing, informal versus formal rules, and the responsiveness of public agencies, numerical differences in the IDB report reflect actual variation in public spending efficiency.



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 3. Government effectiveness. Adapted from World Bank.

The qualitative differences represented by these numbers are instructive. Countries such as Venezuela, Paraguay, and Nicaragua with low levels of bureaucratic effectiveness possess public sectors characterized by informality, job entry and advancement based largely on political affiliation rather than merit, low morale, and poor institutional memory. Public sector corruption is prevalent in these places. However, highly rated countries like Chile are those that most closely approximate the meritocratic, highly professional Weberian bureaucracy. In those places, corruption is the exception instead of the norm, and bureaucrats often reflect a high level of probity.

Of course, national indicators of bureaucratic effectiveness depict all public agencies within a country with an unnecessarily broad brush, when instead capacity can vary wildly from agency to agency (Dargent, 2011; Gingerich, 2013; Bersch, Praça, & Taylor, 2017). Gingerich (2013), for instance, uses comprehensive public employee surveys in Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile to show that the range of inter-agency bureaucratic quality may exceed differences in agency quality across countries. Likewise, Bersch et al.'s (2017) analysis in Brazil of agency capacity and autonomy—the extent by which officials are constrained by the interests and actions of other actors, like the political leadership, interest groups, news media, and international organizations—reveals an administrative “archipelago of excellence” where high-performing Brazilian agencies coexist with a multitude of low-performing ones. Together, these studies suggest that certain key technocratic agencies, especially those relating to economics or finance, exhibit higher degrees of Weberianness while others, especially in social policy, have a more mixed record.

The causes of bureaucratic (in)efficiency vary. One line of conventional wisdom holds that the existence of higher public sector wages decreases corruption and increases efficiency of the public sector. However, Panizza (2001) does not find a clear correlation between the average public–private wage differential and the quality of the public sector in Latin America. Conversely, following Rauch and Evans' (2000) contention that meritocratic recruitment is the most important determinant of the quality of the public sector, Panizza finds a positive correlation between the degree of meritocracy in Latin American bureaucracy (relative to the private sector) and its overall quality. A more recent global study finds that adequate wages are necessary but insufficient for controlling bureaucratic corruption. And while there is a lack of evidence supporting the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies, anti-corruption audits and e-governance are generally more effective (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). There are also a number of historical and cultural factors that likely play a role. In his study of Mexican citizens' experiences with their country's “low-trust bureaucracy,” Peeters (2018) concludes that structural and intractable characteristics of the broader administrative context, such as authoritarian legacies, can produce behavioral patterns that shift attention away from a fair and efficient service provision.

Administrative Reform

A constant response of public management scholars and policy experts to Latin America's (perceived) underperforming public sector has been to suggest administrative and governance reforms (e.g., Graham, Grindle, Lora, & Seddon Wallack, 1999; Tulchin & Garland, 2000; Schneider & Heredia, 2003; Echebarría & Cortázar, 2007). Since the onset of the crisis in statist growth in the 1980s, the dominant model has been New Public Management (NPM), a paradigm that involves the application of private sector management models to improve the efficiency of public service. The first generation of NPM reforms were concerned with decreasing the size of the state, while subsequent reforms sought to make structural and cultural changes (Hood, 1995). In Latin America, as in the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and other developed democracies, it was right-of-center governments that tended to implement NPM reforms, although centrist governments maintained these changes (Pereira & Spink, 1999; Barzelay, 2000, 2001; Pereira, 2001; Arellano-Gault & Gil-García, 2004; Panizza, 2004; Ferraro, 2006).

As with any governance strategy, NPM reforms have succeeded or failed to different degrees across the region (Arellano-Gault & Gil-García, 2004; Rezende, 2008). The structures of the public sectors in Latin America became more flexible following NPM's guidelines, although not under a single pattern. Inconsistencies in organizational efficiency and policy outputs, especially in places without meritocratic bureaucracies, suggest that NPM's technical and entrepreneurial approach may be inappropriate in places with politicized public sectors (Manning, 2001; Peters, 2001). Variation in implementation and success (Polidano, 1999) instead suggests that universal standards for reform are probably unrealistic and should instead be situationally determined (Grindle, 2007). From a bureaucratic political perspective, the lack of success also indicates that administrative reforms may achieve little without concomitant political reforms.

Nonetheless, no single public management paradigm has supplanted NPM in Latin America. Post-NPM reform measures ostensibly emerged in the late 1990s in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, while much of Latin America was still preoccupied with trying to undertake its previous wave of recommendations. Among other things, these reforms sought to counteract the disintegration or fragmentation brought about under NPM by promoting centralization and enhanced coordination, especially among organizations (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). It is unclear to what extent these changes have actually taken hold, even in supposed early adopter states like New Zealand (Lodge & Gill, 2011).

Instead, reforms in Latin American public administration since the early 2000s have focused on the adoption of results-based management and e-governance (Ramos & Milanese, 2017). The first of these is a public management strategy by which processes, outputs, and services contribute to the realization of clearly stated expected accomplishments and objectives. It is focused on achieving quality results, improving administrative performance, and monitoring and reporting on performance in planning, budgeting, auditing, project management, and monitoring, and may be seen as a response to the more acute problems of the NPM model associated to the excessive emphasis on efficiency over effectiveness. International agencies, such as the IDB and the Latin American Center of Administration for Development, have widely promoted results-based budgeting, and countries across the region have adopted it to varying degrees (CLAD, 2010; Kaufmann, Sanginés, & García Moreno, 2015). The leaders in implementation of this strategy have been Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, especially in terms of the components of results-based budgeting and monitoring and evaluation (García, Moreno, & García López, 2010).

The second major public administration reform trend across Latin America and the Caribbean has been the adoption of e-government, the use of information and communication technologies to facilitate the delivery of government information and services, restructure administrative procedures, and enhance citizen participation. E-government has taken a variety of forms, ranging from simply obtaining information and downloading administrative material to applying for licenses, voting, and even contributing to public policy, all with the goal of making service delivery easier and more transparent (Sanabria, Plischoff, & Gomes, 2014). However, there are still some challenges. One problem with e-government in the developing world, including Latin America, is the digital divide (Warf, 2014). Although the proliferation of smart phones has helped democratize access, e-government is still likely to be more successful in more developed countries or subnational areas where internet penetration rates are high than in impoverished ones. This may explain, in part, why e-government initiatives have been more successful in places like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay rather than Haiti, Nicaragua, or Honduras (United Nations, 2018).

What Latin American Bureaucracies Do

The role of the bureaucracy varies across countries and over time: As described, some states are more ubiquitous in their regulation and involvement in the social and economic spheres while governments in other places are more reluctant to expand the state's role beyond certain key functions. Regardless of the setting, however, Latin American bureaucrats and their agencies

execute at least three fundamental tasks: policy design and formulation, private sector regulation, and public policy implementation.

Policy Formulation

When politicians create a new program, they do not establish all the details regarding policy implementation, but instead delegate some of that policymaking authority to the bureaucratic agents. Although the agency must stay within the established statutory bounds, it has a great deal of latitude in determining how exactly to execute policy (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001). From a politician's or a citizen's perspective, this may be beneficial, since the people who administer policy often know much more about those issues than the politicians making it. However, it can also be dangerous for politicians, since bureaucratic agents may alter aspects of policy to better reflect their own interests and preferences than those of their political principals. Politicians, then, must exercise some degree of control or oversight over bureaucrats while bureaucrats seek to maximize their autonomy from politicians.

This “fundamental tension” between politicians and bureaucrats is omnipresent in the policymaking process, perhaps because the ideal level of bureaucratic autonomy is not clear. Some, like Cleaves (1974), demonstrate the success of policy design from autonomous bureaucrats in the presence of weak presidents, while others, like Schneider (1991), demonstrate how presidential control in the absence of an efficient bureaucracy may be more effective. Of course, greater bureaucratic autonomy gives public servants the ability to use their expertise as they best see fit. Nunes (2015) shows that the increased autonomy and insulation of bureaucrats who manage Brazil's criminal justice system allowed them to develop new rules and facilitate their approval despite popular opposition to measures that limit the state's punitive capacity.

Career civil servants and professional bureaucrats are not the only sources of policymaking power within the bureaucracy. Dargent (2011, 2014) explores the central role that politically appointed technocrats play in the policymaking process in Peru and Colombia. These well-educated and well-qualified individuals have dotted the Latin American state for decades, dating to well before the third wave of democratization, and have often been insulated from popular and electoral pressures—allowing them a higher degree of autonomy and flexibility in their policy responses than many career bureaucrats. Dargent offers evidence that technical reform teams often act as agenda setters and adopt decisions that diverge from politicians' expectations, yet manage to maintain their positions and advance their policy preferences against the interests of other powerful actors as a consequence of their expertise.


However, even the most autonomous, well-intentioned, and capable policymaker may fail to design successful policy. Using evidence from pension and health care policy diffusion in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Peru, Weyland (2006) demonstrates that cognitive limitations, especially bounded rationality, heavily influence the ways in which policymakers choose, evaluate, and implement social reforms. He argues that policymakers are compelled by cognitive limitations, uncertainty, and time pressures to pursue policy solutions that are often arbitrary and that may produce suboptimal outcomes.

Regulation of the Private Sector

Regulations, one of the government's essential administrative tools for achieving policy goals, are specific standards or instructions concerning what individuals, businesses, and other organizations can or cannot do. While governance through (relatively) autonomous regulatory authorities started in the 1880s in the United States, state-led economic development models in Latin America obviated a need for their widespread adoption in the region through much of the 20th century (Whitehead, 1994). Instead, governance through regulatory authorities in Latin America started late and was confined to a few distinct sectors rather than being adopted uniformly across them (Levi-Faur & Jordana, 2006).

However, economic liberalization and privatization processes that began in the 1980s created demand for the establishment of independent regulatory agencies to design and enforce rules to protect consumers. Places that had previously shunned regulation outside of finance suddenly required specialized agencies to exert oversight of and control over newly privatized business entities in telecommunications, electricity, water, pharmaceuticals, the environment, food, occupational safety, insurance, and more (Levi-Faur & Jordana, 2006). As a result, states began constructing institutional frameworks for regulatory policy by establishing dedicated bodies to promote regulatory quality and to engage in sectorial supervision, inspection, standard setting, rule interpretation, and task sanctioning.

This burst of regulatory institution building in the 1990s more than tripled the total number of regulatory agencies in the region. Figure 3 uses the Regulatory Agencies Data set (Jordana, Levi-Faur, & Fernández i Marin, 2011) to plot their development in 15 sectors across Latin America from 1920 to 2007. As the figure shows, growth was fairly consistent between 1923 and 1989, rising from just a single agency to 52 over a 66-year period—with nearly half of these agencies in the financial sector. However, in the decade between 1990 and 1999, the total rose precipitously to 154 before growth again slowed. This progression took place across all countries in the region, including Cuba (Levi-Faur & Jordana, 2006).




[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 4. Number of regulatory agencies in Latin America across 15 sectors. Adapted from Global Regulatory Agencies Dataset.

Nonetheless, despite progress in establishing regulatory institutions, most Latin American countries still lack effective institutional oversight of the regulatory process. While many countries have taken steps to improve their regulatory governance framework in the 2010s, gaps remain in terms of the implementation of key tools, such as consultations with stakeholders, regulatory impact assessments, and ex post evaluations (Querbach & Arndt, 2017). In regional water governance, for instance, incongruities between the level of government at which the sector was regulated (centrally) and managed (locally) stunted the positive impact of the reforms (Bertoméu-Sánchez & Serebrisky, 2018). Indeed, the quality of the service affects sectorial performance. In an analysis of electricity regulation in Latin America, Andrés, Guasch, and López Azumendi (2008) find that the mere existence of a regulatory agency, regardless of a utility's ownership, can improve public utility performance, as does the experience of the regulatory agency and its governance strategies.

Of course, the institutional and regulatory frameworks vary by country and policy sector as a function of agency design (Mueller & Pereira, 2002; Rocca, 2014), regulators' independence (Baird & Fernandes, 2014; Enns-Jedenastik, 2015) and technical expertise (Andrés et al., 2008), and budget control (Carpenter, 1996). Figure 4 shows regulatory quality perceptions from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database. There are few clear longitudinal trends. Consistent with other evaluations, Chile fares quite well in regulatory quality across sectors (OECD, 2016), with Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Costa Rica not far behind. Consistent with the literature, Colombian regulatory quality has steadily improved since the late 1990s (López-Murcia, 2013;

OECD, 2013), while Argentina's has risen since the election of business-friendly President Mauricio Macri in 2015 (Leins, 2018). On the other end of the spectrum, the quality of regulations in Venezuela has collapsed since 1999, reflecting the disappearance of state regulation of the private sector as the state has simultaneously grown and displaced that sector.



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 5. Regulatory quality. Adapted from World Bank.

Policy Implementation

The third fundamental activity the public administration carries out is policy implementation, the translation of policy proposals into practice by an agent, including policy evaluation, control, and follow-up. Existing scholarship addresses implementation in Latin America across a wide range of policy domains, including such areas as criminal justice and policing (Dewey, 2012; Nunes, 2015), education (Grindle, 2004), elections (Hartlyn, McCoy, & Mustillo, 2008), energy (Pérez, 2000), the environment (Orihuela, 2014), industry (Montero, 2001; Ponce & McClintock, 2014), labor (Amengual, 2011), public health (Rich, 2013; Ferguson et al., 2016), transportation (Palermo, 2006), and water and sanitation (Rocca, 2014), as well as multiple types of public services (Langbein & Sanabria, 2013, 2017). These works examine the multitude of issues affecting the relative success or failures of policies and propose recommendations to improve them.

Many analysts tend to understand variation in implementation outcomes as a function of bureaucratic capacity or the ability to define, implement, and sustain policies in the face of political or social resistance (e.g., Tommasi, 2011). As described, public agencies in Latin America reflect a wide range of organizational capacity, often resulting in an “implementation gap” between policy proposals and policy delivery (Grindle, 2009). A great deal of the literature proposes remedies to close this gap and grow capacity. To cite only a few examples, a number of scholars, especially those in favor of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, maintain that shrinking the bureaucracy and decentralizing reforms should make it more efficient (e.g., Hood, 1991). Others, like Santiso (2015), reject a direct link between size and efficiency, and instead promote (re-)centralization via strong centers of government as well as professionalization of the senior civil service and the application of new technology to make government more transparent. Similarly, Grindle's work provides a number of proposals, including improving an agency's organizational culture—the patterned behavior of human relationships within an organization—which should increase capacity and result in better-performing agencies (Grindle, 1997), and staffing bureaucratic positions via meritocratic recruitment processes (Grindle, 2012). In short, the literature is replete with proposals to improve capacity.

Yet even in places with a weak state and poor public sector performance, public agencies can achieve efficient delivery. Famously, the success of Mexico's *Oportunidades* and Brazil's *Bolsa Família* conditional cash transfer programs in alleviating poverty and promoting education have led to their broad diffusion across Latin America and beyond (Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2009). Some studies examine the creative bureaucratic or managerial origins of this type of service delivery. For example, Rich

(2013) and Alcañiz (2016) show how weak political authority and resource scarcity in Brazil, Argentina, and other countries compelled bureaucrats to use alliances with civil society or transnational actors to achieve outcomes. Likewise, in their groundbreaking study, Tendler and Freedheim (1994) show how an emphasis on job dedication, sense of mission, and flexible response to citizen demands allowed the Health Agent Program (PAS) in the Brazilian state of Ceará to succeed in the face of long odds. Similarly, in a comprehensive survey of 4,800 social innovation projects in Latin America and the Caribbean over a 5-year period, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) identified some common characteristics of the most successful projects, including community participation at different stages of policymaking and good communication between different levels of government (Rey de Marulanda & Tancredi, 2010). In sum, while agency capacity may impede service delivery, it does not preclude it.

Challenges

Regardless of the setting, all bureaucracies are susceptible to common problems that detract from their efficiency, such as regulatory capture by private interests, lack of agency independence and autonomy, and a weak organizational structure or culture. Thus, although some Latin American bureaucracies have achieved a degree of autonomy from politicians (Eaton, 2003; Nunes, 2015), a great many others continue to face interference from their political principals (Ferraro, 2008; Batista da Silva, 2011), impeding bureaucrats' abilities to implement and regulate policy. A more widespread issue is public sector corruption, something that has been particularly problematic throughout the region.


Other weaknesses, however, may be a product of politics. Writing about the United States, Terry Moe observed that, "public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy rises out of politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power" (Moe, 1989, p. 267). Indeed, while something like public sector corruption is not necessarily a consequence of political decisions, many of the other weaknesses in Latin American bureaucracies have political roots: budget volatility and lack of resources, personnel turnover (presidentialism, etc.), and a lack of incentives for merit-based civil service reform.

Corruption

Public sector corruption is a recurring problem in Latin America that undermines the quality of policy implementation as well as citizen trust. The specific form that corruption takes ranges from *mordidas* (bribes) paid to traffic cops or other street-level bureaucrats to large-scale embezzlement of public funds and bribe taking in bidding for public works contracts. Generally, administrative reform tends to focus on the top end of administrative hierarchies at the expense of low-level ones. Filgueiras and Aranha (2011) find that despite important changes in oversight of the Brazilian state, administrative reforms have assigned limited priority to frontline civil servants. While organizational progress focused on upper-level public employees, there was little impact on the middle and lower echelons, meaning that practices like graft and bribery between public employees and ordinary citizens remained.

While there are limitations to relying solely on corruption perceptions when trying to measure corruption (Olken, 2009), the "control of corruption" indicator from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) database provides one comprehensive cross-national approximation of the concept. This measure captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the degree to which private interests have achieved "capture" of the state. Figure 6 reflects the poor perceptions of bureaucratic probity in the region, with a majority of countries placing below the global mean. The country plots show that Uruguay and Chile, and to a lesser degree Costa Rica and Cuba,

have consistently reflected the highest degrees of bureaucratic probity in the region (notwithstanding Chile's slight drop since 2014), while Venezuela has been and continues to reflect some of the highest perceptions of public sector corruption in the entire world. It bears mentioning, of course, that there is also significant in-country variation in levels of public sector corruption (Langbein & Sanabria, 2013).



[Click to view larger](#)

Figure 6. Public sector corruption. Adapted from World Bank.

Despite its persistence, corruption may not be an intractable problem; specifically, a change in bureaucratic recruitment strategies may provide some needed relief. In an analysis of bureaucratic features and their effects on corruption in 52 countries, Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2012) find that meritocratic recruitment consistently reduces corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Moreover, other allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees' competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact. Similarly, Gingerich (2013) uses survey data from Brazil to show that the relationship between having obtained a bureaucratic post via a public examination (*concurso público*) and having authority over the allocation of public contracts, licenses, and loans varies systematically across agencies in a manner aligned with employee perceptions of bureaucratic capacity. In short, reorienting recruitment practices away from patronage positions could be a necessary first step for politicians and policymakers hoping to decrease corruption and improve public sector performance.

Problems with Political Roots

Other problems may originate from outside the bureaucracy. Meier's "first normative principal of bureaucracy" (1997) holds that bureaucracies are optimal policy instruments for a variety of problems and can perform well or best when given clear goals, political support for these goals, adequate resources, and the autonomy to devise solutions based on expertise. The problem for him, as it was for Goodnow (1900/2017), is the politics can get in the way of good governance. Latin America's multiparty presidentialism is a perfect illustration of this.

The region's institutional setup imposes a number of obstacles to bureaucratic success. Ames (1987) shows how political actors in the region deploy public expenditures as a tool of presidential survival, using the budget to reward or penalize different groups and regions—and therefore impeding the ability of the public administration to get things done. And while repressive authoritarian regimes retrenched spending on health and education (Huber, Mustillo, & Stephens, 2008), democratic regimes often fail to provide sufficient resources to public agencies (Repetto, 2000; Alcañiz, 2016).

Similarly, administrations across the continent not only regard bureaucratic posts as the spoils for patronage appointments (Grindle, 2012), but as necessary tools to forge cabinet coalitions to govern (Praça, Freitas, & Hoepers, 2011), since, lacking

parliamentarism's formal rules for government formation, Latin America's multiparty presidential systems tend to produce minority governments and legislative gridlock (Negretto, 2006). Given its political expediency, politicians may resist merit-based civil service reform, since patronage systems offer politicians flexibility to achieve a wide variety of political and policy objectives.

The results are predictable: Public service recruitment based on patronage is more fully embedded in Latin American politics than in any other place in the world and endures despite the broad adoption of civil service reforms in a number of countries (Grindle, 2012). This is especially true of Central American bureaucracies, which, with the exception of Costa Rica, are characterized by limited independence and low technical capacity. According to Echebarría and Cortázar (2007), entry into public administration and career progress in these places is strongly influenced by political or clientelistic criteria, either because no regulatory framework governs these processes (Nicaragua) or because such regulation is simply not practiced (Guatemala and Honduras). The dismissal of a significant number of public employees in state agencies following changes in political leadership is a common practice, and the widespread absence of wage policies leads to compensation practices that are easy prey for cronyism.

In turn, high rates of administrative turnover, especially if caused by political appointment, can be highly detrimental to bureaucratic success. As Cornell (2014) explains, in general, high bureaucratic turnover rates result in civil servants with less experience, lower institutional memory, and shorter time horizons. Adding to this, politically appointed bureaucrats may additionally exhibit a reluctance to engage in old projects. Even if turnover is not high, patronage-based political removals and appointments can be detrimental to policy implementation and regulation. For example, regulatory agencies were reformed in the 1990s to include fixed-term mandates, provisions to prevent the dismissal of staff as a result of regulatory decisions, and successive reappointment of board members in order to limit political influence on agency decisions. However, Jacint and Ramió Matas (2010) find a divergence between regulatory agency heads' mandates and their formally established fixed terms, affected by means of systematic early resignations.

Consequently, it is possible that many proposals of bureaucratic reform fail to see the real problems of governance. Resolving difficulties in the bureaucracy requires policymakers and reformers to address their political origins, from interference to volatile budgets, to high turnover of political appointees. Doing so will strengthen the civil service and prove helpful in attending nonpolitical problems like corruption.

Concluding Thoughts

It is imperative for scholars to increase their knowledge of Latin American bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics in the region. In presidential systems, the executive is the largest branch in government, and across Latin America the executive exercises considerable power and resources. While scholars possess an increasingly sophisticated knowledge of legislative politics, political parties, and even voter behavior across the region, there has not been a concomitant growth in understanding the political roots of bureaucratic organization, behavior, and outcomes. Yet the bureaucracy has been a focal point for shaping politics, society, and even economics since Latin American independence in the 19th century.

Despite their centrality, however, Latin America public agencies often fail to meet the Weberian ideal of bureaucratic organization. They suffer from organizational deficits, exhibit low responsiveness, and often possess low execution capacity. Many of them also reveal low channels of meritocratic recruitment, accountability, transparency, probity, and predictable long-term careers (Grindle, 1997). Still, there is a great deal of variation by country over time and across agencies in terms of their

bureaucratic quality and the agencies' abilities to efficiently provide services and implement policy. Accordingly, there is variation in the scope and quality of bureaucracies' chief functions of policymaking, regulation, and implementation across the region, especially as the size and function of the state continue to evolve. Moreover, politicians and bureaucrats in the region have often found creative solutions to agency weakness. Addressing persistent problems of corruption and politically rooted structural issues would help to make these policy successes the norm rather than the exception.

Discussion of the Literature

Outside the field of public administration, the study of Latin American bureaucracy is underdeveloped. With the exception of Centeno and Ferraro (2013) and Garavaglia and Ruíz (2013), many of the edited compilations of Latin American politics are composed of single-country studies with no texts dedicated to the bureaucracy (e.g., Moya, 2011; Ocampo & Ros, 2011; Santiso & Dayton-Johnson, 2012; Kingstone & Yashar, 2013). Peer-reviewed work is also comparatively rare in comparison to research on other institutional actors such as the legislature or judiciary. In a survey of 14,860 articles in 32 top journals from political science and public administration journals between 2000 and 2015, Polga-Hecimovich and Trelles (2016) find that only 102 deal with public administration in any meaningful way. Likewise, many standard undergraduate political science textbooks on the region only superficially mention public administration. For example, while Arceneaux (2013, 131–136) includes an entire chapter on the executive branch and a subsection dedicated to the bureaucracy, Weeks (2014) and Kline, Wade, and Wiarda (2018) only briefly mention it, and others (e.g., Hellinger, 2011; Skidmore, Smith, & Green, 2014) fail to discuss public administration and governance altogether.

Existing scholarship tends to fall into one of three scholarly traditions in the study of bureaucracy: that of public administration, that of organizational sociologists, and that of political science. Each of these traditions takes a different approach to the study of the state and politics, and there is limited interdisciplinary work among them.

From the field's inception at the end of the 19th century, public administration scholars focused on the prescriptive legal, structural, and procedural aspects of administration. After World War II, the field began to incorporate the scientific and methodological aspects of political science, although public administration (or public management) as a field continues to be taught at many universities in a separate school or specialized curriculum apart from political science. This is the school that dominates academic journals in Latin America, with articles that often take a more descriptive approach and focus on policy outputs and civil service behavior rather than politics (e.g., Pérez, 2000; Repetto, 2000; Palermo, 2006; Regalsky, 2010). A great deal of work in this field (e.g., Schneider & Heredia, 2003) has examined Latin American state reform and the reorganization of the civil service, public finance, the judiciary, public management, as well as agency responsiveness, transparency, and legitimacy. This is also the most influential approach contributing to international organizations' and multilateral lending institutions' organizational analyses, policy recommendations, and reform suggestions for the Latin American state (see reports such as Lora, 2006; Echebarría & Cortázar, 2007; Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2007; Stein & Tommasi, 2008; Calderón & Servén, 2010; Scartascini, Stein, & Tommasi, 2010; Scartascini, Spiller, Stein, & Tommasi, 2011; Afonso et al., 2013; Khemani, 2013).

The field of organizational behavior, however, investigates the impact that individuals, groups, and hierarchy have on behavior within organizations for the purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving organizational effectiveness (i.e., capacity). An underlying assumption of this field is that a scientific approach can be applied to the management of workers. This discipline is informed by other social sciences, including psychology, sociology, social psychology, anthropology, and political science. In practice, organizational behavioral studies tend to analyze individual organizations or bureaus from which they draw more

generalizable conclusions—something more studied in the United States than Latin America (for some exceptions, see Portes & Smith, 2008; Mazzuca, 2010; Falletti, 2011; Feldmann, 2012).

Political scientists' approach to the study of bureaucracy focuses on the intersection of legislative or presidential politics and public administration (i.e., bureaucratic politics) to understand how politics influences policy, and vice versa. This field uses a scientific approach to unpack the political arrangements that lead to different bureaucratic structures, behaviors, and performance. Political science studies of the bureaucracy tend to care about policy outputs, but generally when understood as a function of political and bureaucratic interactions (e.g., Eaton, 2003; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Dargent, 2011; Praça et al., 2011; Gingerich, 2013; Carlin, Love, & Zechmeister, 2014).

Regardless of the analytical approach, most of these studies focus on a single case (whether a country, policy sector, or individual policy) and refrain from explicit cross-national comparisons of policies or organizations. Further, many of these are concentrated in the larger or wealthier countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, with the smaller and poorer countries of Central America and the Caribbean being the least studied. Relevant policy areas include such things as aviation regulation (Monteiro, 2008; Baird & Fernandes, 2014), criminal justice (Davis, 2006; Dewey, 2012; Nunes, 2015), education (Soifer, 2009), electoral management (Hartlyn et al., 2008; Gehlbach & Simpson, 2015), energy policies (Pérez, 2000), environmental governance (Brockett & Gottfried, 2002; Orihuela, 2014), the relationship between the public and private sectors (Montero, 2001; Schneider, 2002, 2009; Duvanova, 2012; Ponce & McClintock, 2014), labor regulations (Amengual, 2011), public health policies (Rich, 2013), science (Alcañiz, 2010), transportation (Palermo, 2006), and water and sanitation (Regalsky, 2010; López-Murcia, 2013; Rocca, 2014), as well as the impact of corruption on policy implementation (Langbein & Sanabria, 2013, 2017).

There are numerous avenues for exploration. A first set of questions may be descriptive and ask how public agencies in Latin America are staffed, organized, and perform task implantation. This is an important baseline from which scholars may draw data and ideas in order to ask more theoretically minded questions and generate region-specific hypotheses. A second set of questions may ask how well other notions of public administration, governance, and bureaucratic politics travel to the developing world. For instance, how do bureaucratic appointments and staffing differ in the inchoate, multiparty systems that dot the region? What about the value of representative bureaucracy in promoting effectiveness in places where agency capacity is otherwise low?

A last set of questions should examine underexplored topics. Some examples include the following: What political actors control bureaucratic appointments? What political–institutional factors determine the size of the bureaucracy? How do party systems affect the number and organization of agencies? How are regulatory decisions made? How insulated are agencies from political actors? How do clientelism and corporativism shape bureaucratic behavior? What do bureaucratic career patterns look like, especially in political appointees? What these questions have in common is a focus on administrative organization and organizational performance as a function of the real political characteristics, interests, and weaknesses that define Latin American governments.

Perhaps the most underexplored dimension of these studies, however, is policy implementation. Saetren's (2005) global literature review of articles, books, chapters, and dissertations shows that Latin America and Oceania are the two most neglected parts of the world with regard to implementation studies. Of 3,523 journal articles and 1,005 books and chapters examining policy implementation, only 2% involved Latin America. Similarly, of 2,773 doctoral dissertations between 1933 and 2003, only 3% focused on Latin America. Research on this topic could help explain not only why many public policies fail, but under what circumstances they manage to succeed.

Acknowledgments

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of or endorsement by the U.S. Naval Academy, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. This research is neither sponsored nor funded by any organization.

Primary Sources

The public bureaucracy is wide-ranging, and primary source documents to study this topic are correspondingly expansive. There are at least two principal types: (1) case-specific documents and information produced by politicians, bureaucrats, or citizens where data need to be collected and systematized; and (2) government, international organization, or academic databases whose data have been previously aggregated for download and use.

Case-specific documents include official and unofficial reports originating with public agencies, directives from political principals (i.e., the office of the president, the legislature, the judiciary), and public or private feedback from citizens regarding their interactions with the bureaucracy or experiences with policy implementation. With regard to the first point, public administrations across Latin America publish primary source reports and internal agency audits as part of normal operations, while other unpublished documents may be available by making formal requests under each country's information transparency laws (i.e., the equivalent to Freedom of Information Act requests in the United States). They also tend to publish things like budgeting and personnel information. Second, politicians who design policy and delegate it to bureaucrats produce public documents tracing that delegation process or even the appointment and removal of bureaucrats, especially through unilateral executive directives like decrees, memoranda, and public statements from the office of the president, ministerial decrees from the executive cabinet, and judicial decrees and even lawsuits from the judiciary. Completing the troika of documentary sources, documentation from citizens, ranging from evaluations of how specific policies affected them to legal challenges in response to policy change, is an excellent source of material.

In addition, there are myriad statistical databases that provide previously systematized data. Governments collect individual-level data in order to formulate policy and examine outputs as a normal part of evaluating implementation and success. In Latin America, occupational categories for both public and private employees are standard and comparable in the surveys from the Mercosur (*Mercado Común del Sur*, Southern Common Market) countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well as the associate country of Chile (INDEC, **2011**). This information is important to determine public sector employment as a function of overall employment, exact occupation, mean hours worked, educational background, and other characteristics necessary to determine such things as bureaucratic human capital. This is not merely hypothetical: Panizza (**2001**) used this household survey information from 17 Latin American countries to analyze how salaries affect public sector quality, and Moscovich (**2016**) shows how to map bureaucracies at the subnational level in Argentina using official national data.

International organizations, financial institutions, and supranational government organizations also provide publicly available primary source information. Relevant institutions for Latin American data include the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Organization of American States, as well as the United Nations. The World Bank's World Governance Indicators database, which uses expert surveys and over 30 data sources to generate governance indicators for six dimensions of governance across every Latin American country since 1996, is one particularly relevant example. Similarly, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, a joint initiative from the Universidad de la Plata and the World Bank, gathers statistics on poverty and other distributional and social variables from 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries based on micro data from the aforementioned household surveys. Organizations provide policy-specific data as well. The Social

Assistance, Politics and Institutions database, developed at the United Nations University research center, provides longitudinal and comparable information on social assistance programs in developing countries from 2000 to 2015. For each program, such as Brazil's *Bolsa Família*, the database describes its basic characteristics, budget and financing, and population coverage.

Universities are a third source of primary data, especially in relation to citizen evaluations of policymaking, governance, and implementation. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which is run from Vanderbilt University and releases comprehensive public opinion survey results from across the region biennially, is perhaps the best example of this. Individual scholars and their institutions also systematize and make available bureaucratic and policy information, tracking political and bureaucratic outputs. One such example is the Regulatory Agencies Dataset (Jordana et al., **2011**), which tracks regulatory agencies in 15 sectors across Latin America from 1920 to the present (2019).

Further Reading

Barzelay, Michael. (2000). The new public management: A bibliographical essay for Latin American (and other) scholars. *International Public Management Journal*, 3, 229–265.

Find this resource:

Centeno, Miguel A., & Ferraro, Agustín E. (Eds.). (2013). *State and nation making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the possible*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, & Ruiz, Juan Pro. (Eds.). (2013). *Latin American bureaucracy and the state building process (1780–1860)*. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars.

Find this resource:

Geddes, Barbara. (1994). *Politician's dilemma: Building state capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Find this resource:

Gingerich, Daniel W. (2013). Governance indicators and the level of analysis problem: Empirical findings from South America. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3), 1–38.

Find this resource:

Graham, Carol, Grindle, Merilee S., Lora, Eduardo, & Seddon Wallack, Jessica (Eds.). (1999). *Improving the odds: Political strategies for institutional reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2007). *Going local: Decentralization, democratization, and the promise of good governance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2012). *Jobs for the boys. Patronage and the state in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Find this resource:

Langbein, Laura, & Sanabria, Pablo. (2017). Independent professional bureaucracies and street-level bribery: Comparing

changes in civil service law and implementation in Latin America. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 19(5), 435–451.

Find this resource:

Levi-Faur, David, & Jordana, Jacint. (2006). Towards a Latin American regulatory state? The diffusion of autonomous regulatory agencies across countries and sectors. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 29(4–6), 335–366.

Find this resource:

Lora, Eduardo (Ed.). (2006). *The state of state reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Maxfield, Sylvia, & Schneider, Ben Ross (Eds.). (1997). *Business and the state in developing countries*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Find this resource:

Panizza, Ugo. (2001). Public sector wages and bureaucratic quality: Evidence from Latin America. *Economía: Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA)*, 2(1–3), 97–151.

Find this resource:

Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser. (2001). New public management reform: Now in the Latin America agenda, and yet. . .” *Revista Internacional de Estudos Políticos*, 9, 117–140.

Find this resource:

Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser, & Spink, Peter (Eds.). (1999). *Reforming the state: Managerial public administration in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Find this resource:

Polga-Hecimovich, John, & Trelles, Alejandro. (2016). The organizational consequences of politics: A research agenda for the study of bureaucratic politics in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58(4), 56–79.

Find this resource:

Ramió Matas, Carles. (2001). Los problemas de la implantación de la nueva gestión pública en las administraciones públicas latinas: Modelo de estado y cultura institucional. *Revista del CLAD: Reforma y Democracia*, 21, 75–116.

Find this resource:

Schneider, Ben Ross, & Heredia, Blanca (Eds.). (2003). *Reinventing Leviathan: The politics of administrative reform in developing countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Find this resource:

Soifer, Hillel David. (2012). Measuring state capacity in contemporary Latin America. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32(3), 585–598.

Find this resource:

Tendler, Judith. (1997). *Good government in the tropics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Find this resource:

Zuñanic, Laura, & Iacoviello, Mercedes. (2010). The weakest link: The bureaucracy and civil service systems in Latin America.

In C. Scartascini, E. Stein, & M. Tommasi (Eds.), *How democracy works: Political institutions, actors, and arenas in Latin American policymaking*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

References

Afonso, António, Romero, Alma, & Monsalve, Emma. (2013). *Public sector efficiency: Evidence for Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Alcañiz, Isabella. (2010). Bureaucratic networks and government spending: A network analysis of nuclear cooperation in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 45(1), 148–172.

Find this resource:

Alcañiz, Isabella. (2016). *Environmental and nuclear networks in the global south* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Amengual, Matthew. (2011). Cambios en la capacidad del Estado para enfrentar las violaciones de las normas laborales. Los talleres de confección de prendas de vestir en Buenos Aires. *Desarrollo Económico*, 51(202–203), 291–311.

Find this resource:

Ames, Barry. (1987). *Political survival: Politicians and public policy in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Find this resource:

Andrés, Luis, Guasch, José Luis, & Azumendi, Sebastián López. (2008). *Regulatory governance and sector performance: Methodology and evaluation for electricity distribution in Latin America*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Find this resource:

Arceneaux, Craig L. (2013). *Democratic Latin America*. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge.

Find this resource:

Arellano-Gault, David, & Gil-García, José Ramón. (2004). Public management policy and accountability in Latin America: Performance-oriented budgeting in Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela (1994–2000). *International Public Management Journal*, 7(1), 49–71.

Find this resource:

Baird, Marcelo Fragano, & de Almeida Lopes Fernandes, Ivan Filipe. (2014). Flying in clear skies: Technical arguments influencing ANAC regulations. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 8(2), 70–92.

Find this resource:

Barzelay, Michael. (2000). The new public management: A bibliographical essay for Latin American (and other) scholars. *International Public Management Journal*, 3, 229–265.

Find this resource:

Barzelay, Michael. (2001). *The new public management: Improving research and policy dialogue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Find this resource:

Batista da Silva, Mariana. (2011). Independence after delegation? Presidential calculus and political interference in Brazilian regulatory agencies. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 5(2), 39–74.

Find this resource:

Bersch, Katherine, Praça, Sérgio, & Taylor, Matthew M. (2017). State capacity and bureaucratic autonomy within national states: Mapping the archipelago of excellence in Brazil. In M. Centeno, A. Kohli, & D. Yashar (Eds.), *States in the developing world*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Bertoméu-Sánchez, Salvador, & Serebrisky, Tomás. (2018). *Water and sanitation in Latin America and the Caribbean: An update on the state of the sector* (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2018/10). Florence, Italy: European University Institute.

Find this resource:

Brockett, Charles D., & Gottfried, Robert R. (2002). State policies and the preservation of forest cover: Lessons from contrasting public-policy regimes in Costa Rica. *Latin American Research Review*, 37(1), 7–40.

Find this resource:

Bronstein, Hugh. (2016, May 23). Argentina's Macri kills layoff bill in 1st legislative challenge. *Reuters*.

Find this resource:

Calderón, César, & Servén, Luis. (2010). *Infrastructure in Latin America* (Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 5317). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Find this resource:

Cárdenas, Mauricio. (2010). State capacity in Latin America. *Economía: Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA)*, 10(2), 1–45.

Find this resource:

Carlin, Ryan E., Love, Gregory J., & Zechmeister, Elizabeth J. (2014). Trust shaken: Earthquake damage, state capacity, and interpersonal trust in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 46(4), 419–436.

Find this resource:

Carpenter, Daniel P. (1996). Adaptive signal processing, hierarchy, and budgetary control in federal regulation. *American Political Science Review*, 90(2), 283–302.

Find this resource:

Centeno, Miguel A., & Ferraro, Agustín E. (Eds.). (2013). *State and nation making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the possible*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Chong, Alberto E., & López-de-Silanes, Florencio. (2005). *Privatization in Latin America: Myths and reality*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Christensen, Tom, & Lægreid, Per. (2007). The whole-of-government approach to public sector reform. *Public Administration*

Review, 67(6), 1059–1066.

Find this resource:

CLAD. (2010). *Gestión Pública Iberoamericana para el siglo XXI*. Caracas, Venezuela: Centro Latinoamericano de Administración para el Desarrollo (CLAD).

Find this resource:

Cleaves, Peter. (1974). *Bureaucratic politics and administration in Chile*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Find this resource:

Cornell, Agnes. (2014). Why bureaucratic stability matters for the implementation of democratic governance programs. *Governance*, 27(2), 191–214.

Find this resource:

Dahlström, Carl, Lapuente, Victor, & Teorell, Jan. (2012). The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), 656–668.

Find this resource:

Dargent, Eduardo. (2011). Agents or actors? Assessing the autonomy of economic technocrats in Colombia and Peru. *Comparative Politics*, 43(3), 313–332.

Find this resource:

Dargent, Eduardo. (2014). *Technocracy and democracy in Latin America: The experts running government*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Davis, Diane E. (2006). Undermining the rule of law: Democratization and the dark side of police reform in Mexico. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48(1), 55–86.

Find this resource:

Dewey, Matías. (2012). The making of hybrid stateness: Sources of police performance in the Conurbano. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32(3), 659–672.

Find this resource:

Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, & Magaloni, Beatriz. (2009). Aiding Latin America's poor. *Journal of Democracy*, 20(4), 36–49.

Find this resource:

Downs, Anthony. (1967). *Inside bureaucracy*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Find this resource:

Duvanova, Dinissa. (2012). Bureaucratic discretion and the regulatory burden: Business environments under alternative regulatory regimes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 573–596.

Find this resource:

Eaton, Kent. (2003). Can politicians control bureaucrats? Applying theories of political control to Argentina's democracy. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45(4), 33–62.

Find this resource:

Echebarría, Koldo, & Cortázar, Juan Carlos. (2007). Public administration and public employment reform in Latin America. In E. Lora (Ed.), *The state of state reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Ennsner-Jedenastik, Laurenz. (2015). Credibility versus control: Agency independence and partisan influence in the regulatory state. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(7), 823–853.

Find this resource:

Falletti, Tulia G. (2011). Varieties of authoritarianism: The organization of the military state and its effects on federalism in Argentina and Brazil. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46(2), 137–162.

Find this resource:

Feldmann, Andreas E. (2012). Measuring the Colombian “success” story. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32(2), 739–752.

Find this resource:

Ferguson, Neil M., Cucunubá, Zulma M., Dorigatti, Ilaria, Nedjati-Gilani, Gemma L., Donnelly, Christl A., Basáñez, María-Gloria. . . Lessler, Justin. (2016). Countering the Zika epidemic in Latin America. *Science*, 353(6297), 353–354.

Find this resource:

Ferraro, Agustín. (2008). Friends in high places: Congressional influence on the bureaucracy in Chile. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 50(2), 101–129.

Find this resource:

Ferraro, Agustín E. (2006). Una idea muy precaria: El nuevo servicio civil y los viejos designados políticos en Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 41(2), 165–182.

Find this resource:

Filgueiras, Fernando, & Aranha, Ana Luiza Melo. (2011). Controlling corruption in frontline civil service: Rules, discretionary power, and reforms in Brazil. *DADOS: Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 54(2), 349–387.

Find this resource:

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Borges, Mariana, Makarin, Alexey, Mannah-Blankson, Theresa, Nickow, Andre, & Zhang, Dong. (2018). Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works.” *World Development*, 105, 171–188.

Find this resource:

Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, & Ruiz, Juan Pro (Eds.). (2013). *Latin American bureaucracy and the state building process (1780–1860)*. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars.

Find this resource:

García Moreno, Mauricio, & García López, Roberto. (2010). *La gestión para resultados en el desarrollo: Avances y desafíos en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Gehlbach, Scott, & Simpser, Alberto. (2015). Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1), 212–224.

Find this resource:

Gingerich, Daniel W. (2013). Governance indicators and the level of analysis problem: Empirical findings from South America. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3), 1–38.

Find this resource:

Goodnow, Frank. (2017). *Politics and administration: A study in government*. New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1900)

Find this resource:

Graham, Carol, Grindle, Merilee S., Lora, Eduardo, & Seddon Wallack, Jessica (Eds.). (1999). *Improving the odds: Political strategies for institutional reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2004). *Despite the odds. The contentious politics of education reform*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2007). *Going local: Decentralization, democratization, and the promise of good governance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2009). La brecha de la implementación. In F. Martínez-Navarro & V. Garza Cantú (Eds.), *Política Pública y Democracia en América Latina: del Análisis a la Implementación*. México City, Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrúa.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (2012). *Jobs for the boys. Patronage and the state in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Find this resource:

Grindle, Merilee S. (Ed.). (1997). *Getting good government: Capacity building in the public sectors of developing countries*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Find this resource:

Grugel, Jean, & Riggirozzi, Pía. (2012). Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and reclaiming the state after crisis. *Development and Change*, 43(1), 1–21.

Find this resource:

Hartlyn, Jonathan, McCoy, Jennifer, & Mustillo, Thomas M. (2008). Electoral governance matters: Explaining the quality of elections in contemporary Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(1), 73–98.

Find this resource:

Hellinger, Daniel. (2011). *Comparative politics of Latin America: Democracy at last?* New York, NY: Routledge.

Find this resource:

Hendrix, Cullen S. (2010). Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(3), 273.

Find this resource:

Hirschman, Alberto O. (1968). The political economy of import-substituting industrialization in Latin America. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 82(1), 1–32.

Find this resource:

Hood, Christopher. (1991). A public management for all seasons. *Public Administration*, 69(1), 3–19.

Find this resource:

Hood, Christopher. (1995). The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 20(2–3), 93–109.

Find this resource:

Huber, Evelyne, Mustillo, Thomas M., & Stephens, John D. (2008). Politics and social spending in Latin America. *Journal of Politics*, 70(2), 420–436.

Find this resource:

Huber, John D., Shipan, Charles R., & Pfahler, Madelaine. (2001). Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2), 330–345.

Find this resource:

Iacoviello, Mercedes. (2006). Analysis comparativo por subsistemas. In K. Echebarría (Ed.), *Informe sobre la situación del servicio civil en América Latina*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Iacoviello, Mercedes. (2014). *Diagnóstico institucional del servicio civil en América Latina: Ecuador*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

INDEC. (2011). *Clasificación de Actividades Económicas para Encuestas Sociodemográficas del MERCOSUR*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República (INDEC).

Find this resource:

Jordana, Jacint, Levi-Faur, David, & Fernández i Marin, Xavier. (2011). The global diffusion of regulatory agencies: Channels of transfer and stages of diffusion. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(10), 1343–1369.

Find this resource:

Jordana, Jacint, & Ramió Matas, Carles. (2010). Delegation, presidential regimes, and Latin American regulatory agencies. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 2(1), 3–30.

Find this resource:

Kaufmann, Jorge, Sanginés, Mario, & García Moreno, Mauricio. (2015). *Construyendo gobiernos efectivos: Logros y retos de la gestión pública para resultados en América Latina y el Caribe*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Khemani, Stuti. (2013). Buying votes vs. supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Find this resource:

Kingstone, Peter, & Yashar, Deborah J. (Eds.). (2013). *Routledge handbook of Latin American politics*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Find this resource:

Kline, Harvey F., Wade, Christine J., & Wiarda, Howard J. (Eds.). (2018). *Latin American politics and development* (9th ed.). New York, NY: Westview Press.

Find this resource:

Langbein, Laura, & Sanabria, Pablo. (2013). The shape of corruption: Colombia as a case study. *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(11), 1500–1513.

Find this resource:

Langbein, Laura, & Sanabria, Pablo. (2017). Independent professional bureaucracies and street-level bribery: Comparing changes in civil service law and implementation in Latin America. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 19(5), 435–451.

Find this resource:

Leins, Tom. (2018, February 20). How President Mauricio Macri changed Argentina's telecom landscape. *TeleGeography*.

Find this resource:

Levi-Faur, David, & Jordana, Jacint. (2006). Towards a Latin American regulatory state? The diffusion of autonomous regulatory agencies across countries and sectors. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 29(4–6), 335–366.

Find this resource:

Levitsky, Steven, & Roberts, Kenneth M. (Eds.). (2011). *The resurgence of the Latin American left*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Find this resource:

Lodge, Martin, & Gill, Derek. (2011). Toward a new era of administrative reform? The myth of post-NPM in New Zealand. *Governance*, 24(1), 141–166.

Find this resource:

López-Murcia, & Daniel, Julián. (2013). Regulatory agencies and courts in the south: The overlaps in Colombian water regulation. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 5(2), 105–132.

Find this resource:

Lora, Eduardo (Ed.). (2006). *The state of state reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Macdonald, Laura, & Ruckert, Arne. (2009). *Post-neoliberalism in the Americas*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Find this resource:

Mahoney, James. (2013). Militarization without bureaucratization in Central America. In M. Centeno & A. E. Ferraro (Eds.), *State and nation making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the possible*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Manning, Nick. (2001). The legacy of the new public management in developing countries. *International Review of*

Administrative Sciences, 67(2), 297–312.

Find this resource:

March, James G., & Simon, Herbert A. (1993). *Organizations* (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (Original work published 1958)

Find this resource:

Mazucca, Sebastián L. (2010). Access to power versus exercise of power reconceptualizing the quality of democracy in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 45(3), 334–357.

Find this resource:

Meier, Kenneth J. (1997). Bureaucracy and democracy: The case for more bureaucracy and less democracy. *Public Administration Review*, 57(2), 193–199.

Find this resource:

Moe, Terry M. (1989). The politics of bureaucratic structure. In J. E. Chubb & P. E. Peterson (Eds.), *Can the government govern?*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Find this resource:

Monteiro, Cristiano Fonseca. (2008). Empresários e ação política no contexto das reformas para o mercado: o caso da aviação comercial. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, 16(Suppl.), 159–180.

Find this resource:

Montero, Alfred P. (2001). Making and remaking “good government” in Brazil: Subnational industrial policy in Minas Gerais. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43(2), 49–80.

Find this resource:

Moscovich, Lorena. (2016). El doble estatus de los cuerpos burocráticos subnacionales: el balance entre gestión pública y acumulación política. Propuesta de análisis con evidencia de un país federal. *Revista SAAP*, 10(1), 97–122.

Find this resource:

Moya, José C. (Ed.). (2011). *The Oxford handbook of Latin American history*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Find this resource:

Mueller, Bernardo, & Pereira, Carlos. (2002). Credibility and the design of regulatory agencies in Brazil. *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, 22(3), 65–88.

Find this resource:

Musacchio, Aldo, Pineda Ayerbe, Emilio I., & García, Gustavo. (2015). *State-owned enterprise reform in Latin America: Issues and possible solutions*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Negretto, Gabriel L. (2006). Minority presidents and democratic performance in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48(3), 63–92.

Find this resource:

Nunes, Rodrigo M. (2015). The politics of sentencing reform in Brazil: Autonomous bureaucrats, constrained politicians and

gradual policy change. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 47(1), 121–148.

Find this resource:

Ocampo, José Antonio, & Ros, Jaime (Eds.). (2011). *The Oxford handbook of Latin American economics*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Find this resource:

OECD. (2013). Regulatory policy in Colombia: Going beyond administrative simplification. In *OECD reviews of regulatory reform*. Paris, France: OECD.

Find this resource:

OECD. (2016). Regulatory policy in Chile: Government capacity to ensure high-quality regulation. In *OECD reviews of regulatory reform*. Paris, France: OECD.

Find this resource:

Olken, Benjamin A. (2009). Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality. *Journal of Public Economics*, 93(7–8), 950–964.

Find this resource:

Orihuela, José Carlos. (2014). The environmental rules of economic development: Governing air pollution from smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 46(1), 151–183.

Find this resource:

Palermo, Silvana A. (2006). Del Parlamento al Ministerio de Obras Públicas: La construcción de los Ferrocarriles del Estado en Argentina, 1862–1916. *Desarrollo Económico*, 46(182), 215–243.

Find this resource:

Panizza, Francisco. (2004). A reform without losers: The symbolic economy of civil service reform in Uruguay 1995–96. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 46(3), 1–28.

Find this resource:

Panizza, Ugo. (2001). Public sector wages and bureaucratic quality: Evidence from Latin America. *Economía: Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA)*, 2(1–3), 97–151.

Find this resource:

Payne, J. Mark, Zovatto, Daniel G., & Mateo Díaz, Mercedes. (2007). *Democracies in development: Politics and reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.

Find this resource:

Peeters, Rik. (2018). Low-trust bureaucracy: Understanding the Mexican bureaucratic experience. *Public Administration and Development*, 38(2), 65–74.

Find this resource:

Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser. (2001). New public management reform: Now in the Latin America agenda, and yet. . ." *Revista Internacional de Estudos Políticos*, 9, 117–140.

Find this resource:

Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser, & Spink, Peter (Eds.). (1999). *Reforming the state: Managerial public administration in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Find this resource:

Peters, B. Guy. (2001). *The future of governing* (2nd ed.). Lawrence: Kansas University Press.

Find this resource:

Pírez, Pedro. (2000). Relaciones de poder y modelos de gestión: la energía eléctrica en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1900–1960. *Desarrollo Económico*, 40(157), 97–120.

Find this resource:

Polga-Hecimovich, John, & Trelles, Alejandro. (2016). The organizational consequences of politics: A research agenda for the study of bureaucratic politics in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 58(4), 56–79.

Find this resource:

Polidano, Charles. (1999). The new public management in developing countries. Manchester, U.K.: Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester.

Find this resource:

Ponce, Aldo, & McClintock, Cynthia. (2014). The explosive combination of inefficient local bureaucracies and mining production: Evidence from localized societal protests in Peru. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 56(3), 118–140.

Find this resource:

Portes, Alejandro, & Smith, Lori D. (2008). Institutions and development in Latin America: A comparative analysis. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43(2), 101–128.

Find this resource:

Praça, Sérgio, Freitas, Andréa, & Hoepers, Bruno. (2011). Political appointments and coalition management in Brazil, 2007–2010. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 3(2), 141–172.

Find this resource:

Querbach, Tobias, & Arndt, Christiane. (2017). Regulatory policy in Latin America: An analysis of the state of play. In *OECD regulatory policy working papers*. Paris, France: OECD.

Find this resource:

Ramos, Conrado, & Milanesi, Alejandro. (2017). Public management models, Latin America. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), *Global encyclopedia of public administration, public policy, and governance*. New York, NY: Springer.

Find this resource:

Rauch, James E., & Evans, Peter B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 75(1), 49–71.

Find this resource:

Regalsky, Andrés. (2010). De Buenos Aires a las provincias. La formación de una gran empresa pública. Obras Sanitarias de la Nación, 1891–1930. *Desarrollo Económico*, 50(199), 455–487.

Find this resource:

Repetto, Fabián. (2000). Gestión pública, actores e institucionalidad: las políticas frente a la pobreza en los '90. *Desarrollo Económico*, 39(156), 597–618.

Find this resource:

Rey de Marulanda, Nohra, & Tancredi, Francisco B. (2010). *From social innovation to public policy: Success stories in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Santiago, Chile: Economic Commission for Latin América and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

Find this resource:

Rezende, Flávio da Cunha. (2008). The implementation problem of new public management reforms: The dilemma of control and the theory of sequential failure. *International Public Management Review*, 9(2), 40–65.

Find this resource:

Rich, Jessica A. J. (2013). Grassroots bureaucracy: Intergovernmental relations and popular mobilization in Brazil's AIDS policy sector. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 55(2), 1–25.

Find this resource:

Rocca, Mariela Verónica. (2014). Water services in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area: How does state regulation work? *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 8(2), 32–47.

Find this resource:

Saetren, Harald. (2005). Facts and myths about research on public policy implementation: Out-of-fashion, allegedly dead, but still very much alive and relevant. *Policy Studies Journal*, 33(4), 559–582.

Find this resource:

Sanabria, Pablo, Pliscoff, Cristian, & Gomes, Ricardo. (2014). E-government practices in South American countries: Echoing a global trend or really improving governance? The experiences of Colombia, Chile, and Brazil. In M. Gascó-Hernández (Ed.), *Open government: Opportunities and challenges for public governance*. New York: Springer.

Find this resource:

Sánchez, Francisco, & Polga-Hecimovich, John. (2019). The tools of institutional change under post-neoliberalism: Rafael Correa's Ecuador. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 51(2), 379–408.

Find this resource:

Santiso, Carlos. (2015). Governing to deliver: Three keys for reinventing government in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Governance*, 28(2), 123–126.

Find this resource:

Santiso, Javier, & Dayton-Johnson, Jeff (Eds.). (2012). *The Oxford handbook of Latin American political economy*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Find this resource:

Scartascini, Carlos, Spiller, Pablo, Stein, Ernesto, & Tommasi, Mariano (Eds.). (2011). *El juego político en América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las políticas públicas?* Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Scartascini, Carlos, Stein, Ernesto, & Tommasi, Mariano. (2010). *How democracy works: Political institutions, actors, and arenas in Latin American policymaking*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Schneider, Ben Ross. (1991). *Politics within the state: Elite bureaucrats and industrial policy in authoritarian Brazil*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Find this resource:

Schneider, Ben Ross. (2002). Why is Mexican business so organized? *Latin American Research Review*, 37(1), 77–118.

Find this resource:

Schneider, Ben Ross. (2009). Hierarchical market economies and varieties of capitalism in Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 41(3), 553–575.

Find this resource:

Schneider, Ben Ross, & Heredia, Blanca (Eds.). (2003). *Reinventing Leviathan: The politics of administrative reform in developing countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Find this resource:

Simon, Herbert A. (1997). *Administrative behavior* (4th ed.). New York, NY: Free Press. (Original work published 1947)

Find this resource:

Skidmore, Thomas E., Smith, Peter H., & Green, James N. (2014). *Modern Latin America* (8th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Find this resource:

Soifer, Hillel David. (2009). The sources of infrastructural power: Evidence from nineteenth-century Chilean education. *Latin American Research Review*, 44(2), 158–180.

Find this resource:

Stein, Ernesto, & Tommasi, Mariano (Eds.). (2008). *Policymaking in Latin America: How politics shapes policies*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Find this resource:

Tendler, Judith, & Freedheim, Sara. (1994). Trust in a rent-seeking world: Health and government transformed in northeast Brazil. *World Development*, 22(12), 1771–1791.

Find this resource:

Thies, Cameron G. (2006). Public violence and state building in Central America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(10), 1263–1282.

Find this resource:

Tommasi, Mariano. (2011). Latin America: How state capacity determines policy success. *Governance*, 24(2), 199–203.

Find this resource:

Tulchin, Joseph S., & Garland, Allison M. (Eds.). (2000). *Social development in Latin America: The politics of reform*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Find this resource:

United Nations. (2018). *United Nations E-government survey 2018*. New York, NY: United Nations.

Find this resource:

Warf, Barry. (2014). Geographies of E-government in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Journal of Latin American Geography*, 13(1), 169–185.

Find this resource:

Weber, Max. (2012). *The theory of social and economic organization* (A. M. Henderson & T. Parsons, Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1947)

Find this resource:

Weeks, Gregory. (2014). *Understanding Latin American politics*. London, U.K.: Pearson.

Find this resource:

Weyland, Kurt. (2006). *Bounded rationality and policy diffusion: Social sector reform in Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Find this resource:

Whitehead, Laurence. (1994). State organization in Latin America since 1930. In L. Bethell (Ed.), *The Cambridge history of Latin America*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Find this resource:

Notes:

(1.) A more conservative estimate from the Ecuadorean Confederation of Public Servants (CONASEP) places the increase at about 28% between 2007 and 2015, from 467,000 to 600,000 total public servants.

John Polga-Hecimovich

Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy